460 BUCKINGHAM v. PEDDICORD.

not answering, he may be committed, or the plaintiff may obtain
an order to take the bill pro confesso at the next term, or that if a
defendant shall have further time to answer, and shall not, before
the expiration of the time, put in a good and sufficient answer, the
bill may be taken pro confesso) without any further delay, and a
decree passed thereon. From which, it follows, that after a de-
fendant's answer has, upon exceptions, been declared to be insuf-
ficient, the plaintiff, because of his deeming the discovery he seeks
necessary to his case, may, if he can, by the specified process,
have the defendant arrested and committed to close custody until
he does answer; or the order, determining the answer to be insuf-
ficient, and requiring a better answer by an appointed day, may be
considered, as in truth it is, a grant of further time to answer,
since the defendant thereby not merely obtains time to deliberate
before he makes answer, but has its deficiency, after it has been
made, particularly pointed out, and is thereupon allowed further
time to supply its defects. And, therefore, after the expiration of
the time allowed by such an order, if a good and sufficient answer
be not put in, the plaintiff may well have his bill taken pro confesso
without further delay, and a final decree made thereupon accord-
ingly, (a)

If a plaintiff could not be allowed, in this manner, either to have
the defendant attached and compelled to answer, or to have his
bill taken pro confesso, as if no answer at all had been filed, then
those legislative provisions, by which the proceedings against a
defendant to obtain an answer, or have the bill taken pro confesso
have been regulated might be continually evaded or rendered alto-
gether nugatory. It would only be necessary, in any case, for the
defendant to file a mere sham answer, with the express view to its
being declared insufficient, so as to throw the plaintiff back upon and
force him to resort to, and again run out the same line of process
up to that at which he had left off. Such a course, it is evident,
would be in direct opposition to the spirit, if not to the letter, of
those legislative enactments, the clear principles of which may be
so aptly applied to all cases situated like the present. Upon the
whole, therefore, I am of opinion that this plaintiff may now have
his bill taken pro confesso for want of an answer, and have a final
and absolute decree founded upon that default and tacit confession.

Whereupon, it is Decreed, that the said bill of complaint be
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(a) Denny v. Filmer Nelson 65; Ogilvie v. Herne, 13 Ves 563; Landon v. Ready,
1 Cond. Cha. Rep. 23.