BUCKINGHAM v. PEDDICORD. 459

ever, that when the defendant submits to answer the exceptions;
or the answer upon exceptions, is held to be insufficient, and the
defendant answers accordingly, the plaintiff can take no other or
new exceptions, but must have the sufficiency of the whole of such
answers again put to the test upon the original exceptions, (y)

An insufficient answer must of necessity, be regarded as no
answer; since it would be unjust or ruinous, to compel a plaintiff
to reply to, and go to trial, on an insufficient answer, full of absur-
dities and inconsistencies, or which was, in many particulars, pal-
pably deficient. The taking of exceptions to an answer, is tanta-
mount to a demurrer, upon an insufficient plea at law; and if
such a demurrer is sustained, the plaintiff has judgment, because
the plea is insufficient; and so in equity, on exceptions to the
answer being sustained, the like consequences must follow. But
for the adoption of this rule, there would seem to be no end to the
delays which a defendant might produce by repeated sham an-
swers. And indeed, even as the rule now stands, according to
the English system, the expensive delays in chancery proceedings,
under the present mode of obtaining a full answer, after a previous
one had been declared insufficient, have been considered as so
serious a grievance, that there has been recently a great effort
made to obtain from parliament, some reforms, similar to those
which have been so long since engrafted into our system, (z)

If, then, we apply these reasonable and established principles,
that, where a defendant has failed to put in a sufficient answer, as
required, the plaintiff may renew his course of proceeding from
the point at which he had left off when the insufficient answer was
filed; and that an insufficient answer must be regarded as no an-
swer, to the course of proceedings prescribed by the before-men-
tioned legislative enactments, it will be seen that it has been
expressly declared, that on a defendant being returned attached for

(y) Dupont v. Ward, 1 Dick, 133; Turner v. Turner, 1 Dick. 316; Gregor v. Arun-
del, 8 Ves. 88; Partridge v. Haycraft, 11 Ves. 575; Williams v. Davies, 1 Cond. Cha.
Rep. 217; Ovey v. Leighton, 1 Cond. Cha. Rep. 433; Hodgson v. Butterfield, 1
Cond. Cha. Rep. 434; 1 Hair. Pra. Cha. 321.—(z) Anonymous, 2 P. Will. 481;
Hawkins v. Crook, 2 P. Will. 556; S. C. Mosely, 294, 383; Turner v. Turner, 1
Dick. S16; Bromfield v. Chichester, 1 Dick. 379; Child v. Brabson, 2 Ves. 110; Davis
v. Davis, 2 Atk. 24; Darwent v. Walton, 2 Atk. 510; Wallop v. Brown, 4 Bro. C. C.
212, 223; Gordon v. Pitt, 4 Bro. C. C. 406 and 544; Attorney-General v. Young, 3
Ves. 209; 1 Hove. Supp. 362; Jopling v. Stuart, 4 Ves. 619; Gregor v. Arundel, 8
Ves88; Bailey v. Bailey, 11 Ves. 151; 2 Hove. Sup. 251; Anonymous, 2 Ves. jun,
276, and 1 Hove. Sup. 256; Landon v. Ready, 1 Cond, Cha. Rep. 23; 2 Eq, Ca. Abr.
179; Forum Rom. 106.