WELCH v. STEWART. 39

the satisfaction of claim No. 5, and of all others which may be
established in due course of administration.

It is admitted, that the plaintiff Welches claim No. 3, is one
which has not been set forth and demanded by the bill; and there-
fore, that it cannot be deemed to have been established by the
decree; even supposing that it might be introduced after the de-
cree, as an addition to the amount so claimed by him. But a
plaintiff cannot be allowed to split up, and multiply his causes of
action; nor to introduce any other claim, and call the court back
to adjudicate upon it, after a decree has been passed, at his in-
stance, by which it might have been embraced had it been set forth
and demanded in his bill. (6) For in equity, as at law, where a
plaintiff has several claims, the satisfaction of all of which might
be demanded in one suit, or a satisfaction of each of which might
be demanded by a separate suit, he may, at his election, seek satis-
faction by one, or by several suits, (c) But if, by a creditor's
bill, he sets forth and asks satisfaction of only one of his claims,
he must, thereby, be taken to have waived all right to demand
satisfaction in that suit of any other claim which he then had
and might have brought before the court. Under such circum-
stances, therefore, by analogy to the rules prescribed for executors
and administrators, (d) the court will proceed to distribute the
assets among the creditors of the deceased, to the exclusion of
any such claims as the plaintiffs may so introduce as additions to
those specified in their bill, and which additional claims had been
negligently omitted, or improperly withheld.

But in laying down this rule, intended to impose upon a plain-
tiff an obligation to take seasonable care of all his rights, and to
prevent him from vexatiously increasing the expense, and retard-
ing the progress of a suit, instituted for the benefit of others as
well as himself, I would not be understood as going so far as to
determine, that it should have the effect of depriving him of any
other mode of relief to which he may have recourse. Such omit-
ted claim may be founded on a judgment, as in this instance of
claim No. 3, or upon a mortgage, in which case, I am not now
prepared to say, that its not having been demanded bill
would have the effect of depriving the claimant of his or

specific lien.

(b) Strike's case, 1 Bland, 95.—(c) Dickenson v. Harrison, 2 Exch. Rep. 105.
(d) 1785, ch. 80, s.7; 1802, ch. 101, s. 8; 1798, ch. 101, sub ch. 8, s. 13, 14 and 15.