38 WELCH v. STEWART.

plaintiff Welch's claim No. 3; and also, because it was not men-
tioned or demanded in the bill in any form whatever.

16th March, 1829.—BLAND, Chancellor.—The exceptions to
the auditor's report standing ready for hearing, and the solicitors of
the parties having been heard, the proceedings were read and
considered.

I take it to be a well settled rule of this court, that on a credi-
tor's bill, the decree for a sale, in the usual general terms, virtually
and necessarily establishes the claims of all the originally suing
creditors, unless some of them should, by the decree itself, be
specially excepted; since it is very clear, that no sale can be or-
dered, but to pay some one or more debts which have been estab-
lished to the satisfaction of the Chancellor, (a) But such a decree
only establishes the claim of the plaintiff as a debt due from the
estate of the deceased debtor, without prejudice to third persons,
and consequently, if any others, who may have been allowed to
come in as parties to the suit, can shew fraud or any other circum-
stance by which it shall appear that the debt, as so far established,
ought not to be permitted to stand in the way of their interests, it
maybe then shewn and taken advantage of; because the introduc-
tion and reliance upon any such new and collateral matter is not in
any way incompatible with an admission of the stability of any of
those points which had been previously adjudicated upon and
determined by the decree.

But no such new matter having been advanced and relied upon,
as a cause why these claims, Nos. 1, 2 and 5, should be rejected
altogether, or postponed in favour of, and to make way for the sa-
tisfaction of the claims of these excepting creditors, they must
stand as having been established against the estate of the de-
ceased. And the claim No. 1, as inclusive of No. 2, having
been secured by the deed of trust, in the manner set forth by the
bill, must be allowed a preference of satisfaction out of the pro-
ceeds of the trust fund; since it has not been alleged or shewn
that there was any infirmity in the deed of trust as regarded other
creditors, not provided for by it; or that this was not, in fact, one
of intended to be secured by it. The proceeds of the
must therefore be first applied in satisfaction of the
1, as inclining No. 2; and the surplus, if any, together
with the proceeds of the other portion of the deceased's estate to

(a) Strike's case, 1 Bland, 70; Williamson v. Wilson, 1 Bland, 441.