HAMMOND v. HAMMOND. 315

deducted from it. In so far as the executors, into whose hands a
sufficiency of assets came to satisfy those two legacies failed to do
so, they are chargeable with a devastavit; and consequently, they
alone are liable for the whole amount, principal and interest; and
the legatees cannot be allowed to take the place of creditors and
have the amount raised by contribution from the devisees.

It is, in genera], true, that pecuniary legacies bear interest from
the end of one year after letters testamentary have been granted,
allowing that time for the executors to collect the effects of the
deceased, (c) In this instance, there appears to be an additional
reason why interest should be allowed from that time on these
legacies; and that is, their having been expressly declared to be
in lieu of certain specific legacies which, if they had not been
withdrawn, should have been delivered immediately, and could
have been at once made profitable to the legatees; thus indicating
it to have been the intention of the testator himself, that interest
should be allowed as a substitute for the profits of the slaves in lien
of which the money was given; since it is in general, true, that
where one legacy is substituted for another, the substitute will be
attended with the same incidents as the original, (d) I am there-
fore of opinion that interest on these sums has been correctly
charged.

It is alleged, that the whole fund, set apart by the testator for
the payment of his debts, will not be sufficient for that purpose;
and it is upon the truth of this fact, that the plaintiffs claim to
have the assets accounted for by the executors; to have the
amount of the unsatisfied claims against the deceased ascertained;
and to have the other devisees compelled to contribute to the pay-
ment of such debts, according to the terms of the will. Although
all the executors, and the legatees Charles and Harriet, as such,
with all the devisees who have been charged with contribution by
the will, have been made parties to this bill; yet it is not alleged,
that the suit has been instituted generally for the benefit of those
interested in the correct distribution of the real or personal assets
of the testator; or for the benefit of those creditors and others who
may have an interest in the fund appropriated by the testator for
the payment of his debts. The bill contains no distinct and
express allegation, that the plaintiffs had instituted this suit, as

(c) Maxwell v. Wettenhall, 2 P. Will. 26; Pearson v. Pearson, 1 Scho. & Lefr.
11.—(d) Chatteris v. Young, 6 Mad. 31; S. C. 3 Cond. Cha. Rep. 72.