314 HAMMOND v. HAMMOND.

From this clause, and the general tenor of the will, there can be
no doubt, that every devise, and every bequest, including the
emancipation of his slaves, for the gift of freedom to a slave, is a
most precious specific legacy, are all of them specific legacies
which can, in no manner, be made abateable or reducible by any
deficiency of the testator's personal estate; but, in case of any de-
ficiency of that which he has designated as the creditors' fund, the
several devisees, charged with contribution, might be compelled to
contribute toward the satisfaction of the testator's debts to the
whole amount of the property given to them, before the donations
to the wife and freed slaves, who are not so charged, could be at
all molested. Indeed it seems to be admitted, that the intention
of the will, to this effect, is so unequivocally clear as not to leave
room for the smallest doubt upon the subject.

But the testator, by his codicil, informs us, that he himself had
broken in upon the proportionate distribution which he had pre-
viously made with so much precision, and which he had mani-
fested so much solicitude to preserve, by parting with some of the
negroes he had given to his son Charles and his daughter Harriet,
and then says, 'I do therefore, in lieu of the said devises, give
and bequeath to my said son Charles the sum of $700, and to my
said daughter Harriet the sum of $300, respectively.'

From which it clearly appears to have been the intention of the
testator to restore, in all respects, the proportions which had been
thus disturbed; and that the money, so given, should take the
place, and stand in lieu of the negroes in those shares from which
they had been withdrawn; and that he intended to declare, that as
the negroes had been given as specific legacies, subject only to
contributions in the event and manner designated, so those sums
of money should, in like manner, be deemed and taken as specific
legacies, attended with the like benefits, and subject to the same
extent of contingency and incumbrance, and no more.

I am therefore of opinion, that these sums of money, given to
Charles and Harriet, should have been paid by the executors in
the first instance, as specific legacies, out of the fund set apart by
the testator for the payment of his debts, as, in fact, not forming
any part of it; since it cannot be inferred from any thing said by
him, that they were to be paid from any other portion of his estate.
And that then each division, charged with contribution, must con-
tribute, as prescribed by the will, to the payment of such debts as
remain unpaid from that fund, after those two legacies have been