146 BINNEY'S CASE.

d«red by the original act of incorporation; but by a subsequent
enactment, it has been declared, that it should be deemed personal
property, (p) The right to land is, and necessarily must, be regu-
lated by the law of the government under which it is situated.
Mere moveables are generally allowed, by the comity of nations,
to be disposed of according to the law of the place of the owner's
domicile, (q} The reason why land must be governed by the law
of the country where it lies, does not arise, in any manner, from
our common law distinction between real and personal property;
but, from the principles of international law, which regards land as
a portion of the habitation of the nation; and which, from its fixed
and immovable nature as such, must, of necessity, be absolutely
and altogether regulated by the nation to whom it belongs. And
therefore, a conveyance or will of land, a mortgage or a contract
concerning such as canal stock must all be sued upon in Maryland,
and the local nature of the thing requires them to be carried into
execution here, (r) It would seem, however, that in a work of
the kind now under consideration, if tolls are appointed to be
gathered at a place within the jurisdiction of either of the govern-
ments, for the use of a space of canal, a part of which extends
beyond its limits, such toll might be considered as forming a por-
tion of the product of the canal property within the jurisdiction of
the government where they were gathered, (s)

Hence, it appears, that directing the estate of this corporation
to be deemed personal property, can amount to no more than
declaring, that it shall be governed by the municipal regulations of
the country where it lies in relation to personal property, instead
of those relative to real estate; but that it must, nevertheless, be
governed by those laws, and none other, as being an immovable
portion of the habitation of the nation. These principles of public
law, in regard to the immovable property of this corporation lying
beyond the confines of this state, bring us back to the question,
whether this court can exercise any jurisdiction in relation to such
property, and to what extent.

\p) 1827, ch. 61.—(q) I Mad. Chan. 626; Kam. Pri. Eq. b. 3, c. 8, s, 3;
Dixon v, Ramsay, 3 Cran. 319; De Sobry v. De Laistre, 2 H. & J. 224.—(r) Vattel,
b. 2, s. 88; Kam. Pri. Eq. b. 3, c. 8, s. 2; Lord Clive's Jaghire, 1 Coll. Jun. 188;
High v. Darnley, 2 P. Will. 622; Calvin's case, 7 Co. 36; Robinson v. Bland, 2
Burr. 1079; The King v. The Dock Company of Hull, 1 T. R. 219; The Common-
wealth v. Martin, 5 Man. 120; Ex parte Home, 14 Com. Law. Rep. 106;—(s)
Drybutter v. Bartholomew, 2 P. Will. 127; The King v. The Aire & Calder Navi-
gation, 2 T. R. 666; The King v. The Mayor of London, 4 T. R. 21.