BINNEY'S CASE. 145

of Chancery over the matters of which it takes cognizance is co-
extensive with the confines of the state itself. According to its
original constitution, it could act upon the person only; but its
powers have been, in many respects, so enlarged as to enable it to
act also upon the subject in controversy; and it has been specially
authorized to use the executive and coercive process of the com-
mon law. (m) Thus braced and armed it possesses powers and
means to afford redress in almost every case, not exclusively
Belonging to the courts of common law, or in which they are so
constituted as to be able to give adequate relief. * Wherever
a person is to be found within reach of the Court of Chancery,
and he may, in any respect, be considered as a trustee, or the
matter in dispute arises out of a transitory personal contract, not
necessarily involving the title to, and following land; and which
the party may, by personal coercion, be made to execute specifi-
cally, this court may have jurisdiction and decree accordingly.
Therefore, if a defendant be found here he may be decreed to pay
money, or to account for the rents and profits of lands lying in
another, or a foreign country, which he had held and enjoyed; or
if a deed of lands in a foreign country be found to be fraudulent, it
may be ordered to be delivered up and cancelled; or in specific
performance of a contract for land in another state, such a convey-
ance may be ordered as shall be sufficient according to the law of
the state where it lies. But the court will not decree a partition of
such land, or in any manner directly decide upon the title to it, or
upon the validity of a deed or will as a material part of the title;
nor found the relief granted upon the strict title to such property
itself, (n)

The whole estate of The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company,
at least so far as it consists of the canal itself, and its necessary
buildings, and the fixtures attached to them, must, according to
the common law, be regarded as reality; (o) and it was so consi-

(m) 1785, ch. 72, s. 23, 25.—(n) Cartwright v. Pettus, 2 Ca. Chan. 214; Ar-
glasse v. Muschamp, I Vern. 75; Kildare v. Eustace, 1 Vern. 419; Toller v. Car-
teret, 2 Vern. 494; Fryer v. Bernard, 2 P. Will. 261; Derby v. Athol, 1 Ves. 208;
Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444; Roberdeau v. Rons, 1 Atk. 544; Foster v.
Yassall, 3 Atk. 589; Ex parte Marchioness of Annandale, Amb. 80; Pike v. Hoare,
Amb. 428; S. C. 2 Eden, 182; Cranstown v. Johnston, 3 Ves. 170; In the matter
of the Duchess of Chandois, 1 Scho. and Lefr. 301; Lord Clive's Jaghire, 1 Coll.
Jurid. 181; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cran. 158; Guerrant v. Fowler, 1 Hen. and Mun. 4.
(o) Co. Litt. 19, 6; Drybutter v. Bartholomew, 2 P. Will. 127; Buckeridge v.
Ingram, 2 Ves. Jun. 652; Ram. on Assets, 184.