668 THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.

posed upon them, will end there. The injured citizen may complain,
but he can do no more than complain; he will be without redress^

The salary claimed by the present chancellor is a debt due to
him from the State. The law of 1798 has ascertained its amount,
and the Declaration of Rights has declared it shall be secured to
him; and further, that it shall be secured to him during the continu-
ance of his commission. It is a debt due to him from the State,
and continually growing due to him, during that period of time—
and the State, is as much bound to pay that debt, in one form or
other, as it can be bound to pay any debt whatever. The State
cannot now be sued; nor could its property, like that of a tardy or
a fraudulent debtor, at any time be taken and sold to pay its debts.
The legislature have the strength, the physical power to disregard
the constitution; to wrong an individual; to refuse to appropriate
money to pay a debt; to refuse to make provision for the payment
of a salary. But, to do so is contrary to, and a violation of their
moral y their religious, and their constitutional obligation.

Each legislator has, like every other citizen, a deep interest in
the preservation of the constitution in all its perfection and integrity.

Institutions, that cease to command respect, are soon treated
with contempt, and become exposed to the assaults of every rude
intruder—one violation sanctions another; and every breach,
however small, weakens the political edifice; one constitutional
pillar after another may be loosened from its base until all are
tumbled into ruins. That which is now the case of the Chancellor
may soon become the case of every judge in the State. From one
department ruin may be visited upon another, until all the divi-
sions of the government are removed, and every check and balance,
intended to guard and protect the rights of persons and of pro-
perty, against the wayward and inordinate passions and designs of
the few, shall be wholly destroyed.

The House of Delegates are the peculiar guardians of the trea-
sury of the State. They alone appoint the treasurer, who holds
his office at their pleasure. Hence it is obvious, that any person
or officer, whom they may order their treasurer not to pay, will not
be paid; no matter who he may be, or what may be the merits of
his claim. In such ease, the Delegates need not resort to any
expedient or indirect movement to attain their object. It is only
necessary, that they should boldly and firmly give the order;
and, if their treasurer hesitates, the same majority who gave the
order, can at once remove him and appoint a more subservient