THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE. 667

quently, has been virtually deprived of the authority to pay the
chancellor's salary out of that particular fund, as was prescribed by
the act of 1792. This special fund, created by the act of 1792, for
the payment of the chancellor's salary, has, then, been totally
broken up, abrogated and abolished; because, the moneys arising
from the taxes, imposed by that act, have been permanently
diverted from their original destination, by a perpetual law which
mingles them with the general mass, and subjects them indiscrimi-
nately to the general demands upon the treasury. There has been
no law passed since 1792, authorizing either of the treasurers of
the State to pay to the chancellor, in any other manner, the amount
of the salary given him by that act.

Hence, it follows, that if it were even admitted, as it cannot be,
that the act of 1702 would be virtually revived by the expiration
of the act of 1798, there is nothing now left, of the act of 1792, on
which a mere constructive revival can operate, but those parts of it
which fix the amount of the chancellor's salary; because, the resi-
due of it, which created a fund out of which the salary was directed
to be paid, has been altered, and the fund otherwise applied by sub-
sisting perpetual laws. The appropriation to pay, under the act of
1792, having been thus altered and repealed, the chancellor, it is
evident, can be in no better situation, as matters now stand, under the
act of 1792, than under the act of 1798. He would be alike without
any legi^tive warrant to demand payment of the sum specified by
either of those acts as the amount of the chancellor's salary.

But, it may be said, that this discretionary power, as to appro-
priations for the payment of judicial salaries, virtually gives to the
legislature a control over the whole subject. To a certain degree,
this must be admitted. Legislators are under an imperfect, not a
perfect obligation to make appropriations for the payment of such
salaries; or in other words, they are morally and religiously obliged
to obey the constitution. They are morally bound by their duty to
their country; and they are religiously bound by their promissory
oaths, which they take before they can be admitted to their seats.
But, the obligation, thus imposed upon them, is not a perfect one ;
because, they cannot be personally coerced by any superior power,
as by a court of justice, to comply with that obligation. Legisla-
tors, who violate the constitution, may incur the displeasure of the
people; they may feel their moral dignity somewhat lessened and
disturbed; and they may have some very annoying and compunctions
visitings of conscience. But the force of the imperfect obligation, im-