THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE 665

to expire, or, by the refusal of the legislature to continue it, the
act of 1792 was virtually revived and again in force. There ii
not one syllable to be found recorded in the votes and proceedings,
of the last session of either branch of the General Assembly, going
to show, that such was the understanding and belief of the legis-
lature. But, supposing such to have been their opinion, the posi-
tion is not correct, even on common law principles; and is utterly
untenable according to our constitution. It is an established rule
of the common law, that by the repeal of a repealing statute, the
original act is virtually revived. But, that is not the case now
under consideration. It is this: The statute of 1798 professes
to repeal the prior act of 1792, by substituting other provisions, as
to the whole subject, for which that act had provided: and, then
the act of 1798 is, in general terras, limited to two years. Now, in
such case, it has been adjudged, that the prior act does not revive
after the repealing act is spent; unless the intention of the legislature,
to that effect, be expressed. In this instance no such intention has
been expressed; and, consequently, upon common law principles,
neither of those acts are now in force; and our statute book presents
an entire blank so far as regards the chancellor's salary.(w)

But, let it be conceded for a moment, and by way of argument,
that the effect of discontinuing or suffering the act of 1798 to
expire, would be, that the act of 1792 would be revived.—It cer-
tainly will not be contended, that the effect of this constructive
revival of the act of 1792 would be a complete revival of the
whole of it, including all such clauses as had been repealed or
altered by any perpetual and now subsisting law. By a virtual
revival of a law nothing more has been ever understood to be thus
revived, than that which would have continued in force, had it not
be^Blb the law, which was repealed or had expired. This is the
principle of a constructive revival, it goes no further. Now let us

• ' I

(w) Warren ». Wendle, 3 East, 205; The King v. Rogers, 10 East, 069.
1765, ch. 33, note, per HANSON, Chancellor.~-It may be necessary to remark, that
the repealing clause of this act, notwithstanding its expiration, is still in force, There
is an evident and material distinction between a temporary act containing a repeal-
ing clause, which act is suffered to expire, and an act made for the purpose of repeat-
ing another act, which is afterwards itself repealed. In the first case, the legislature
declares its intention, that an act be done away and rendered void, and there is no
proceeding of the legislature afterwards to restore life to the act repealed. In the
second case, the legislature expresses the same intention, but afterwards by doing
away and rendering void the repealing act, its intention cannot be construed other-
wise than to give new life to the act repeated.—(Hanson's Laws of Maryland.)

84