664 THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.

or enact any thing. And, in the enacting clauses, there is not one
word which expresses or suggests a single idea upon the subject
of their security or duration. But read the law, and the thirtieth
section of the Declaration of Rights together, and there is no room
for any doubt whatever. The amount, specified by the law, is
secured^ by the constitution, to each judge, during the continuance
of his commission. So, there is nothing in any part of the law
itself, that declares, or from which it may be inferred, that it can-
not be repealed or altered at the pleasure of any succeeding legis-
lature. But, the nature and character of the subject, for which it
provides, inevitably and necessarily carries us to the constitution,
where we find that positive, mandatory clause, which prohibits
the withholding or diminishing of the salaries of the judges during
the continuance of their commissions.

The security of these judicial salaries, given by this act of
1805, ch. 86, therefore, is expressly rested upon exactly the same
basis, which sustains the salary given to the chancellor, by the act
of 1798. The only difference between the two acts, is as to the
manner in which the foundation of their security and duration is
referred to. The preamble of the act of 1805 leads us to the
foundation of the security and duration of the judges' salaries, by
a direct reference to the Declaration of Rights. The act of 1798,
in a different manner, but, with equal certainty, leads us to the
same immovable basis, whereon we find the security and duration
* of the chancellor's salary reposes. The act of 1805 makes a
general appropriation, and directs the treasurer of the Western
Shore to pay quarterly. But, as to this, these salaries might have
been made payable, as by the act of 1792, out of a special fund, to
be collected from taxes on proceedings at law or the like; or the
appropriation, whether general or special, might have beenjpmited
to five years, as by the act of 1792, or to two years, as by the act
of 1798, or even from year to year, a§ by the several acts continu-
ing the act of 1798, passed since the year 1805. There is then,
in point of principle, when taken in connection with the Declara-
tiont of Rights, no difference whatever between any two of these
laws relative to judicial salaries. They -are all, alike, controlled
by the constitution, which specifies the security and duration of
judicial salaries; and, in each the appropriation is suited to the
Occasion, to. the convenience of the State, or to the then opinion
of the General Assembly.

It may, probably, be said, that the suffering of the act of lfS8