THE CHANCELLORS CASE. §53

ing, that although it was, in some respects, temporary in its terms;
and although it had never been continued by any legislative act;
yet, that it would be virtually continued by operation of the con-
stitution; they, therefore, Beemed it necessary, expressly and by
name, to except this act out of the operation of their general con-
tinuing law; or, in other words, to discontinue it; and, as they
believed, to make such a declaration respecting it as would be equi-
valent to an absolute repeal. If such was their understanding of
the act of 1797, when taken in connection with the constitution—
and it is difficult to perceive how they can be otherwise understood—
the last House of Delegates were certainly correct in considering
both of these acts; as well that of 1797, as the one of 1798; as
well that which had not, as that which had been continued, as
standing in the way of the execution of their resolution to reduce
the chancellor's salary. But the act of 1798, ch. 86, virtually and
effectually, repeals all antecedent acts which had been passed for
ascertaining and fixing the amount of the chancellor's salary; and
is, itself, firmly and immovably sustained by the Declaration of
Rights; and needs no continuing, or other act, for the mere pur-
pose of designating what shall be the amount of the chancellor's
salary.

So much then, as to all those acts, which speak of, or in any
manner have heretofore, compensated the chancellor in his cha-
racter of judge of the land office. The whole of them might have
been passed over in silence, if the Delegates of the last session
had not invoked them into this controversy. But, it is believed,
that, in whatever manner they may be considered, nothing can be
deduced from them, which can, in anyway, impair the right which
the present chancellor has to the salary designated by the act of
1798. Let us now proceed to the consideration of those acts of
Assembly under which the chancellor has been heretofore, and
until the 26th day of February last, compensated for his services
as chancellor.

Whatever inference may be deduced from the language of the
first section of the act of 1798; and, however conclusive it may
seem to be, that any salary given to the chancellor, as chancellor,
must be, and is secured to him, by virtue of the Declaration of
Rights, during the continuance of his commission; yet, it may be
said, that in this instance, and from this act of 1798, no such
inference can be deduced; no such intention can be ascribed
to the legislature who passed it.. Because, by the second sec-