£52 THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.

and to clear away all ambiguity, at the following session, by the
act of 1798, ch. 86, the whole was given to the chancellor, as
chancellor; manifestly with the intention of drawing over the whole
salary, that constitutional guarantee and security which indisputably
and rightfully belonged to such a salary when given to the chan-
cellor as chancellor.

That this was the distinct understanding of those legislators
who passed the act of 1798, will be placed beyond all manner of
doubt, by comparing the phraseology and allusions of the act of
1792, with those of the act of 1798. Prior to the year 1792, the
chancellor had received some additional compensation as judge of
the land office; and, it is to that, which the act of that year refers
by the expressions, "for all duties and services whatever prescribed
or to be prescribed by law." In other words, that legislature meant
'to say, that the chancellor shall no longer be compensated in two dif-
ferent characters; the one part of the compensation to be secured
according to the constitution, and the other during pleasure; but,
that the whole should be constitutionally given and secured to him as
chancellor. By the act of 1797, ch. 71, a part of the chancellor's com-
pensation was given to him " as chancellor and judge of the land
office." And, therefore, when, by the act of 1798, ch. 86, the legis-
lature declare, " that the chancellor shall be entitled to received/or all
duties and services whatever prescribed or to be prescribed by law,
an annual salary of twelve hundred and seventy-five pounds," they
meant precisely the same thing, by those identical same words,
that was meant by the legislature of 1792; that is to say, that
the whole of the chancellor's compensation, as well that which
had been constitutionally secured to him, as that which had been,
until then, bestowed upon him during their pleasure, should all,
henceforth, be secured to him during the continuance of his
commission.

The last House of Delegates, in excepting the act of 1797, ch.
71, from their general continuing law, evidently acted under the
impression and belief, that whatever salary was given to the chan-
cellor, as chancellor, was secured to him during the continuance of
his commission. For, if they were not so impressed, why did they
in express terms refuse to continue that law, which had never been
continued; and, by its own limitation, had expired more than
twenty years previous to that time ? But seeing, that the additional
salary, given by the act of 1797, ch. 71, was given to the chan-
cellor, "chancellor and judge of the land office;" and apprehend-