WILLIAMSON v. WILSON.

closed, his trade broken up, and his commercial reputation utterly
blasted at a single blow, by a malignant application for the appoint-
ment of a receiver, founded on a statement of facts altogether
fabricated and false.

There is one general answer, that may be given to this asser-
tion; which is, that the plainest, most temperate, and best guarded
forms of judicial proceedings, known to the common law, have
been abused and made the instruments of malice. Of which the
multitude and variety of the reported examples, in actions foi
malicious prosecutions and arrests, afford too strong proof: and,
even in this very case, the defendants, by their answer, desire it to
be recollected, that the well guarded common law process of reple-
vin has been wantonly and grossly perverted and abused to their
great wrong and injury. But upon the present occasion, since
these applications have, of late, become more frequent, it may be
well to consider this matter more particularly.

I A receiver is never appointed before answer, but upon very
j strong special ground supported by affidavit ;(d) or, as is the
practice in this State, on a bill sworn to by the complainant;
or, in case of his not being in this State, by some one conusant
of the facts stated. A motion to rescind an appointment is
always heard on a short notice; and a receiver is in no case
permitted to take charge of the property without having first given
bond with approved surety. So far then this chancery power is at
least as little susceptible of abuse as the process of replevin, as is
shewn by the example furnished by the defendants' answer. But,
this is not all; there are other safeguards against the abuse of this
power. The court always reluctantly interferes against the legal
title, only in a case of fraud clearly proved, and of imminent
danger; and a receiver will not be appointed when the matter in
dispute depends on the legal title; unless strong grounds are shewn,
and the rents and profits are in imminent danger.(e)

Where a plaintiff is permitted to come into a court of chancery
in behalf of himself and other creditors, or may sue here because
of the equitable nature of his claim, and in respect of a fund in the
hands of the defendant, out of which he has a right to ask pay-
ment, he may, under certain circumstances, have a receiver put
upon the property or assets liable to his claim. But under no other

(d) Duckworfh v. Trafford, 18 Ves. 283.—(e) Lloyd v. Passingham, 16 Ves. 59;
Norway v. Rowe, 19 Ves. 148, note; Maguire v. Allen, 1 Ball & Bea. 75.