WILLIAMSON v. WILSON. 421

extended no further than to exclude trespassers, to make such
repairs as are indispensably necessary, and to collect and account
for the rents and profits. But, where the preservation of personal
property has been the object, the receiver has been, in many respects,
invested with the authority of a curator bonis of the Roman law.
He has been directed to take into his possession all the moveables;
and if any were of a perishable nature, to sell them. He has been
directed to collect and sometimes to pay debts. Where there ha«
been a breach of duty by a partner, a receiver has been appointed
and charged with the winding up of an unsettled commercial con-
cern, (b) And in all cases he has been held bound to render a
strict account of his stewardship. A receiver is an officer of the
court. He is considered as truly and properly the hand of the
court; but his appointment determines no right; nor does it affect
the title to the property in any way; it will not even prevent the
running of the statute of limitations. The holding of the receiver,
is the holding of the court for him from whom the possession was
taken; therefore, should any loss happen it must be borne by him
from whom the property was taken, not by the party at whose
instance the receiver was appointed.(c)

But it has been argued, that a measure so prompt and vigorous,
as that which has been adopted upon the present occasion, may be
applied to the most pernicious purposes; that it is open to the
greatest abuse; and that the consequences of such a procedure
among commercial people, may become most mischievous and
irreparably ruinous in its operation. I have meditated upon what
has been urged in this respect.

That this court should have the power in unusual and pressing
emergencies, at the instance of a party interested, effectually and
without delay to put its hand upon property, so far as to prevent
waste, inextricable confusion, or total destruction, seems to be
admitted by all to be clearly right, or at least highly beneficial.
The apprehension of abuse from such a power, when exercised by
means of a receiver, seems to have arisen from a contemplation of
the circumstances of this case. These parties were merchants,
who had been extensively engaged in trade in the great emporium
of our State. And, any merchant, it has been said, by means 0f
this power of the court of chancery, may have his counting-house

(b) Peacock v. Peacock, 16 Yes. 49; Harding v. Glover, 18 Ves, 281.—(c) Pow.
Mort. 294, note; 2 Mad. Chan. 233.