LINGAN v. HENDERSON.

bound. But where there exists a partnership in trade, each part-
ner may make certain contracts in the name of the whole which
shall be obligatory alike upon all the partners. Now, in all such
cases, any one of the contractors may satisfy the entire demand of
the contract; and upon its terms being wholly complied with by
any one of them, it is thereby totally extinguished and ceases to be
any longer obligatory upon any one of them in favour of him to
whom it was given. That a contract may be wholly satisfied
by any one of the contractors, and when so satisfied is thereby
totally extinguished as to all, is a principle of law so obviously
rational and just, that it need only to be stated to be universally
admitted.

Consequently it is equally manifest, that any renewment of a
contract, which has been thus satisfied, barred or extinguished,
can only be effected by the exercise of a similar capacity to con-
tract to that which had been called forth for its original formation.
Suppose then, the alleged cause of suit to be an agreement whereby
all the defendants had bound themselves to pay to the plaintiff a
certain sum of money. In support of such a cause of suit it is
necessary to prove, that each one of the defendants, by his express
consent, did actually become bound by it. And, therefore, after it
has been barred or extinguished, it is no less necessary, in order
to show that it has been renewed, to prove, in like manner, that
each of the defendants did, by his express consent, become bound
by such new agreement; because it is no less essential to the
validity of the new, than it was to that of the old agreement, that
it should be shewn to have been expressly assented to by each one
who is proposed to be charged by it. Where there is no separate
cause of suit against any one defendant, and each one of them is
no otherwise chargeable by such agreement than as party with all
his co-defendants, it must be established as an agreement to which
all are liable, or the plaintiff can take no benefit from it, and his
bill must be dismissed. But where it is shewn, that a partnership
in trade did actually exist between the defendants, there, as during
the continuance of such partnership, all the partners may join in
making a promissory note, or the like, in relation to their trade, so
as to bind the firm; so, during the continuance of the partnership,
a promise by any one of the partners will as effectually renew such
contract, as an express promise by all of them; because, during
the continuance of the partnership, each partner has the power to