276 LINGAN 9,

Common, and the dourse of the court, in that respact, is well
settled. The court is involved in no contradiction or inconsist-
ency by any such decree; as a defendant in equity can only be
charged to the extent of his liability, so the court's decree against
him must be modified accordingly. But as no one can be permitted
impertinently to interfere with a matter by which he is not proposed
to be, or obviously cannot be charged, a defendant cannot be
allowed to direct any sort of defence against all or any distinct
portion of the plaintiff's cause of suit in which his interests are not
implicated, or by which he can be subjected to no kind of liability.
Where, however, a defendant's liability is such, as principal or
otherwise, that he must be charged by a decree which affirms
the validity of the alleged cause of suit, then he may rightfully
direct any defence against it which goes to shew, that neither he
himself, nor any one of his co-defendants, ought to be charged by
it; and if he succeeds in establishing such a defence, the plaintiff's
bill must be totally dismissed.

Hence it is obvious, that this class of cases, in which the court
may find it necessary or proper, because of their peculiar circum-
stances, to pass a separate, a reciprocal, a direct, or an inverted
decree, do in reality present nothing which can fairly or in any
way be considered as an exception to this general rule.

But where two or more persons have been bound by the contract
upon which the suit has been brought, and one of them pleads the
Statute of limitations in bar, it has been said, that an acknowledg-
ment made, within the limited time, of its then existing validity by
Such defendant, or by any other of his co-defendants, will take the
case out of the statute. The adjudications in relation to this mat-
ter are various and contradictory. Therefore, without attempting
to reconcile them, it will be sufficient to trace out the reason of the
law so far as it is believed to be properly applicable to this and all
such cases in equity.

To constitute a valid contract of any description, it is indispen-
sably necessary that the parties should be competent to contract;
Said being so competent, that they should all of them, in the
manner prescribed by law, understandingly have given their free
consent to the contract in question, In general, when the contract
purports to be the obligation or promise of two or more persons, it
must be shewn, that each one of them distinctly gave his consent
to it, and thereby actually and in terms for himself became so