LINGAN v. HENDERSON,

which Lydia has said can be allowed to affect the interest of her
husband David. But in the body of this answer, which has
been properly sworn to by her as well as her husband, she
expressly declares, that as to various circumstances as therein
set forth by way of defence, she speaks for herself alone, as the
administratrix of the deceased John Henderson. Where a bill
was filed by a legatee against husband and wife, she being the
executrix, and after they had answgred he died; it was held, that
she was bound by the answer they had so made in his lifetime.(y)
And where the husband and wife had not answered separately, or
had not so answered under the previous sanction of an order of the
court, she was held bound by so much of the answer as was called
for and purported to come from her ;(z) or which in point of fact
had been made by and received from her as her separate answer.(a)
And if a wife who is executrix knows, or apprehends, that her
husband will answer to her prejudice, or if in any case she disap-
proves of the defence he wishes to make, the court will give her
leave to answer separately.(6) So that in whatever way this an-
swer of English and wife is taken, as nothing therein set forth, as
coming from her, can affect his interest; and as he professes, so far
as he answers for himself, to know nothing of the matter, the seve-
ral parts of it, which so distinctly profess to be the allegations of
each, may safely and most advantageously for each be treated as
if they had been set forth in regular and entirely separate answers
from each of them.

Taking this answer in this way, then, it appears, that the defend-
ant David English, without expressly denying any thing, admits
nothing; but puts the whole of the plaintiff's case in issue. His
defence goes to the very origin, foundation and existence of the
plaintiff's whole cause of suit; and, therefore, it behooves them to
sustain their whole case in every way against him, or they must
totally fail. The defendant Lydia, in effect, admits the original
foundation of the plaintiff's cause of suit; but, by way of avoid-
ance, considering it as a contract of bargain and sale of a tract of
land, avers, in substance, that the purchase money, in the modes
therein described, has been paid and fully satisfied. This defence,

(y) Shelberry v. Briggs, 2 Tern. 249.—•(*) Wrottesleyv.Bendish, 3 P. Will. 236;
Le Neve v. Le Neve, 3 Atk. 648.—(o) Chandos v. Talbot, 2 P. Will. 371.—(b) Ex
parte Halsam, 2 Atk. 50;| Wybmira v. Blount, Dick. 155; 2Eq. Ca. Abr, 06; Mitf
Pl. 104.