LINGAN v. HENDERSON. 269
nfieessarily preclude all relief against any one of them. But where
it appears, that the cause of suk against each arises out of distinct
subjects; there, as each defendant is a competent witness as to the
subject in which he is npt interested, so there may, in respect t«*
such different subjects, be separate decrees against each.
But here it has been shown, that the legal representatives of John
Henderson are, all of them, liable to be charged by the contract set out
in the bill, to the extent of tl|e assets which have come to theif
hands respectively. And that, although each of them, to the extent
of those assets, is so entirely liable to the plaintiffs as to entitle
them to any relief, under the general prayer of their bill, that may
be deemed most for their benefit; yet these defendants, as against
each other, have an equitable claim to contribution; and therefore,
as among them, the court may, if called upon, by a decree over,
so adjust the burthen as to cause it to bear equally or in due pro-
portion upon each of them.(w)
Consequently, as this cause of suit is in its nature indivisible,
and the same against all of these defendants; and as no one of
them has even set up, much less sustained any separate defence,
which, like that of a plea of plene administravit by one of two or
more executors, would go to show, that he could not be charged
in connexion with the other defendants, the interests of all must
be bound by the decree, unless it shall be found from the defence
of any one, either that the whole cause of suit never existed, or
that it has been barred or satisfied. It now, therefore, becomes
necessary to consider the nature of the defences, which have been
made to this bill of complaint.
From the general character of the answer of English and wife,
and from the express and distinct allegations in the body of it, and
also from its having been received and replied to by the plaintiffs;
the court may now regard it as the separate answer of each, as
much so as if the wife had obtained an order expressly allowing
her to answer separately. A wife cannot, under any circumstan-
ces, be a witness for or against her husband; and for that reaion,
he can in no case be bound by any thing she sets forth in her
answer, (x) Consequently, whether this is to be considered as
altogether a joint answer; or as being in fact two regular and
distinct answers of these defendants, it is clear, that nothing
(w) Meadbury v. Isdall, 9 Mod. 438; 1 Mad. Chan. 233.—(x) Le Texier v.
Anspack, 15 Ves. 165.
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