RINGGOLD'S CASE. 13

grievance;(t) or from an ordlr involving the merits, and which order
could not be followed out without, in the party of the
benefit of an appeal, or rendering any appeal thereafter, for correcting
the error of such order, entirely nugatory ;(u) yet it it perfectly mani-
fest, from the very nature of the jurisdiction of the Court of Chan-
cery, that the exercise of its various and flexible powers, which
have been expressly so contrived as to afford relief in peculiar
cases, and under emergencies which admit of no delay, where no
just estimate, in anticipation, can be made of the periled rights
of the party, so as to have a satisfaction secured to him, by bond
with surety, in the event of a loss; or were no adequate relief can
be obtained otherwise than by a prompt exercise of the conservative
powers of the court, an order may be called for, in the outset, or in
the progress of a suit, the execution of which, if suspended on
giving bond or otherwise, would be, in effect, to declare, that the
court should exercise no such power. And, besides, if the progress
of a suit in chancery might be delayed, by an appeal from any
of the various interlocutory orders which the circumstances of the
case might require, the suit itself, by such interruptions, by abate-
ments, by loss of testimony, or other accidents, might never be
brought to a final hearing; or the final decision might not be until
after the subject in controversy itself had perished, or been entirely
wasted.

Hence it is obvious, that there are many orders in chancery from
which no appeal ever has been, or ought to be allowed. Such as an
order to shew cause why any particular thing should not be done; or
an order for an attachment to bring a party before the court; or an
exparte order refusing an injunction; or an order granting an injunc-
tion until the coming in of the answer; or then, on motion, dissolving
it;(w) or continuing it until the final hearing, or fitter order; or,
where property was likely to be lost, or materially injured, an order
appointing a receiver to take care of it for the benefit of all con-
cerned ;(x) or an order upon a defendant to bring a sum of money into
courtj which he had admitted, in his answer, did not belong to him,
for the purpose of having it invested so as to be made productive
pending the litigation ;(y) or a mere discretionary decree or order, as

(4) Blount's Case, 1 Atk. 295; Head v. Harris, 2 Scho. & Lefr.563; Roche v. Mor-
gel, 2 Scho. & Lefr. 724 -, Buel v. Street, 9 John. Rep. 447 •, Snowden v. Dorsey, 6 H..
& J. 114—(u) Waldo v. Caley, 16 Ves. 214; Wood v. Milner, 1 Jac. & Wal. 616.
(w) Since altered by 1832, ch. 197.-(x) Altered by 1830, ch, 185, s. 1 —(y) Altered
by1830, ch. 185. a. 1; Thompson v. McKim, 6 H. & J. 327, contra.