12 RINGGOLD'S CASE.

But in the practice under our acts of assembly, in relation to
appeals, there is no evidence to be found of any course of pro-
ceeding analogous to that of the English courts, of justifying bail
in error.

It seems, that originally all decrees of the High Court of Chan-
cery of England were final and conclusive. It not only appears,
that no appeal from a decision of that court was allowed, prior to
the year 1581; but, that the right of appeal, as then first introduced,
remained entirely unsettled until about the year 1662, when the
matter was taken up; and, after having been much opposed, zeal-
ously debated, and maturely considered, was finally settled and
admitted to be as much a constitutional right to appeal from a
decision of the High Court of Chancery, as from a court of com-
mon law.(o) But as, at common law, no writ of error will lie from
a judgment by default or by consent; so in equity the decree or
order appealed from must have been adverse, and not made by the
express or tacit consent of the appellant: as when a party thinks
proper not merely to decline opposition to measures which the court
would enforce ;(p) but, by himself or his counsel, consents to a
decree or order, there lies no appeal from it, even although he gave
no such authority to his solicitor; his remedy being against his
counsel ;(q) nor can any appeal be made generally available from
a decree by defaulter) or, as it would seem, from a decree taking
the bill pro confesso.(s)

The general rule of the common law, which postpones the exer-
cise of the right of appeal until after the final judgment of the
original court, is founded in sound sense; and, as is evident, should
be as closely followed as practicable in allowing appeals from the
Court of Chancery. Therefore, it has been held, that no appeal
can be allowed in equity, but from a final decree; or from an
order grounded on some disputed facts disclosed in the bill and
answer involving the merits of the controversy; and which
order, if executed, would subject the party to some irreparable

(0) Gilb. For. Rom. 190; 1 Harr. Pra. Chan. 676; 2 Mad. Cha. 573 2 Lond. Jurist.
107.—(p) Wood v. Griffith, 19 Ves. 550,1 Meriv. 35.—(9) Downing v. Cage, 1 Eq,
Ca. Abr. 165; Buck v. Fawcett, 3 P. Will. 242; Harrison v. Ramsay, 2 Yes. 488.
Bradish v. Gee, mb. 229; Beresford v. Adair, 2 Cox. 156.—(t) Cunyingham v.
dtayingham, Amb. 89; Stubbs v. ——, 10 Ves. 30; Charman v Charman, 16 Yes.
115.—(s) Davis v. Davis, 2 Atk. 24; Maynard v. Pomfret, 3, Atk. 468; Carew v.
Johnson, 2 Scho. & Lefr. 300; Jopling v. Stuart, 4 Yes. 619 Geary v, Sheridan.,
8 Ves. 192; Ogilvie v. Herne. 13 Ves. 563; Heyn v. Heyn, Jac. Rep. 49