94 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

well taken. The second, fifth and sixth relate to acts or inten-
tions imputed to defendant impairing, or showing the inadequa-
cy of the security, and they are not answered explicitly and
frankly as they should be.

The allegations in the bill, upon which the third, and fourth
exceptions are founded, relate to the application and present po-
sition of the money for which the mortgaged slaves were sold.
It was certainly material to trace this money, and discover where
it is deposited, as otherwise it could not be applied at the prop-
er time, to the payment of the claim of the complainant, should
such payment hereafter be decreed. The right of the com-
plainant to have such application made, depends upon whether
the money alleged to be in the bank, arose from the sales of
the slaves, or other property included in the mortgage. The
bill so alleges, but the answer instead of admitting or denying
this allegation, by which the money in bank could be identi-
fied with that which the defendant received from the sales of
the slaves, which he confesses he sold, states that he applied
the money to his, the defendant's own use. Now this identity
of the money in bank, is an important fact, for upon it de-
pends the right of the complainant, to have it appropriated
specifically to the payment of his claim, the principle being,
that when mortgaged property is turned into money, the mort-
gagee, has a right to have it applied to the payment of his
claim; his rights remaining unaltered by the conversion of the
property into money, Astor vs. Miller, 2 Paige, 68.

For these reasons, I am of opinion, that the injunetion must
be continued, and shall so order.

[No appeal was taken from this order.]