74 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

and fifthly to pay the surplus to the grantor, his executors, ad-
ministrators or assigns. At December session, 1833, Childs ap-
plied to the legislature for a special act, which was passed on the
27th February, 1834, authorising the insolvent commissioners
to extend to him the benefit of the insolvent laws without re-
quiring the usual proof of a two years residence in the state.
His application under this act was made on the 10th March fol-
lowing, and the complainant was appointed his permanent trus-
tee. Sundry creditors of Childs assented to the terms of the
deed, and in consideration of the provisions made in it for the
payment of their debts, released and discharge him therefrom.
It appeared from the proof that the said Childs was insolvent
when he removed into the state and continued so down to the
time when the deed was executed, prior to which time there
were suits and judgments against him.

The bill was filed by the complainant to have this deed set
aside as fraudulent under the insolvent laws, it having been made
in contemplation of applying for their benefit. The answers.
denied that Childs at the time of executing said deed intended
applying for the benefit of the insolvent laws, or that he knew
himself to be insolvent, and the separate answer of Childs sta-
ted his ignorance, at the time of executing the deed, of the pos-
sibility of his obtaining a special act of the legislature in his
favor.

The Chancellor, after stating the facts of the case, referred
to the cases of Heckley vs. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 5
G. & J., 377, and Crawford & Sellman vs. Taylor,6 G. & J., 332,
to show that the meaning of the acts of 1812, ch. 77, and 1816,
ch. 221, making void any deed, &c., to a creditor, made by any
person with a view, or under an expectation of being or becom-
ing an insolvent debtor, and with an intent thereby to give an
undue and improper preference to such creditor, was, that the
party executing the deed, shall at the time, "intend to take the
benefit of the insolvent laws." He said it was necessary to
show, not only that an undue and improper preference was given
by the debtor, but also that this was done "with a view or un-
der an expectation of taking the benefit of the insolvent laws,"