432 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

at that time, for the purpose of ascertaining the condition of
the partnership, and the rights of the respective partners to the
joint property.

The second and third propositions determined by the Chan-
cellor relate to the question, as to what extent and for what
purposes the real estate of this partnership was to be treated as
converted into personalty ? We consider it as now established,
by at least a preponderance of authority, and Upon proper and
just grounds, that the whole partnership estate, whether con-
sisting of real or personal property, is to be regarded in the
view of a court of equity, as a consolidated fund, to be appro-
priated primarily and exclusively to the satisfaction of all the
partnership engagements. In Fereday vs. Whightwick, 4 Con.
C. R., 319, the master of the rolls said—"The general princi-
ple is, that all property acquired for the purpose of a trading
concern, whether it be of a personal or real nature, is to be con-
sidered as partnership property, and is to be first applied ac-
cordingly, in the satisfaction of the demands of the partner-
ship."

In Hoxie vs. Carr, 1 Sum., 183, Mr. Justice Story, in deliv-
ering the opinion of the court, says:

"A question often arises, whether real estate purchased for
a partnership is to be deemed for all purposes personal estate,
like other effects. That it is so as to the payment of the part-
nership debts, and the adjustment of partnership rights, and
winding up the partnership concerns is clear, at least in the
view of a court of equity." And again he says:

"The question, however, in the present case, is not whether
real estate, when it is partnership property, becomes to all in-
tents and purposes, in cases of intestacy and wills, personalty,
but whether it be so treated in equity as between the partners
themselves and the creditors of the partnership. It seems to be
the established doctrine of courts of equity, that it is to be
treated as personalty, as between the partners and their credit-
ors, in whosoever name it may stand on the face of the convey-
ance." This principle is sustained by the cases of Dyer vs.
dark, S Medf., 562; Howard vs. Priest, 5 Medf., 582, and