GOODBURN VS. STEVENS. 431

And, therefore, it was the undoubted privilege of the appel-
lant on the case made by her bill, to demand the profits pro-
duced by the employment of her husband's share of the property,
from his death to the institution of her suit; the assertion of
this claim cannot be justly regarded as evidence of an assent,
on her part, to the continuation of the partnership, so as to im-
plicate her as a partner, or as a ratification of the acts of the
surviving partners.

We cannot perceive anything in the conduct of the appel-
lant evincive of her assent to the continuance of this partner-
ship; and this question is placed beyond controversy by the
commanding fact, that in her bill she expressly prays that the
defendants may be restrained from using in the business of the
concern, her husband's proportion of the personal estate.

There is another objection to the position taken by the coun-
sel for the appellees, that cannot be overcome; and that is,
that it is manifest from the answers of the surviving partners,
that they never consented to receive the administratrix into the
firm as a continuing partner. While they acknowledge their
liability to account to her for the partnership property as it ex-
isted at the death of Samuel Hayes, they reject the idea, that
she possessed any authority to interfere in the management of
the affairs of the company subsequent to that period. We have
already seen that a contract of this description is one of personal
confidence, in which the ability, skill, and character of each
partner is supposed to enter into the consideration of his asso-
ciates in the formation of the connection, and that, therefore,
there can be no legal continuance of a partnership dissolved by
death, in the absence of a new assent on the part of the surviv-
ors. You cannot impose upon the surviving partner, the obli-
gation to introduce into the partnership the representative of
his former associate. Thornton vs. Dixon, 3 Bro. Ch. R., 200;

Marquand vs. New York Manufacturing Company, 17 Johns.,
535; Pearce vs. Chamberlain, 2 Ves. Sr., 33.

We think, therefore, that the death of Samuel Hayes, on the
20th of May, 1825, is to be treated as the period of the disso-
lution of this partnership, and that the accounts are to be taken