ALBERT VS. SAVINGS BANK OF BALTIMORE. 415

drew D. Jones did hold said stock, and there is no evidence
bringing home to the many knowledge, in fact, of any of these
particulars.

The question then is—are there in the facts and circum-
stances of this case sufficient grounds to charge the city of
Baltimore with constructive notice of the violation of his duty
as trustee, by Samuel Jones ? Did the city know enough to
put it on the inquiry and to make it responsible for neglecting
to do so, in the same manner as if it knew, in fact, of the exist-
ence, character and nature of the trust; and that the trustees,
or one of them, meant to misapply the trust fund when the
transfer was made t If the city is liable at all, it is upon the
ground of negligence, in not instituting the proper investiga-
tion, when it was in possession of the knowledge of circum-
stances sufficient to awaken its suspicions that Jones was about
to commit a breach of trust by a misapplication of the trust
property.

In this case, as has been stated, the stock stood upon the
books of the city, in the names of Samuel Jones and Andrew
D. Jones, trustees; but for whom they were trustees, and what
was the nature and character of the trust, did not appear. In
this respect, it differs altogether from the case of Wayman and
Stockett vs. The Bank, et al., in 5 Gill; for, in the latter case,
the entry on the transfer book of the. bank, displayed the ori-
gin, nature and character of the trust, and who were the bene-
ficiaries, and the Court of Appeals say, that "the bank by this
transfer had notice of the trusts with which the stock was
clothed, and that the complainants were the legal proprietors
of the stock; and its officers being the trustees of the stock-
holders, could not, without making the bank responsible, by
any negligence or mistake, allow the title to pass to the stock
by a transfer, by any other persons than the trustees, without
involving the bank in responsibility." The power of the trus-
tees, holding the legal title, to transfer the stock, thus standing
in their names, was affirmed by the court, who maintained
them to be the only persons authorized to make the transfer,
and the bank was held liable, because it permitted the transfer