376 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.
reparable ruin to the property, in the character in which it has
been enjoyed.
And, the Court of Appeals of this state, in the case ofJime-
lung vs. Seekamp, 9 G. & J., 468, adopting the language of
Chancellor Kent, in Jerome vs. Ross, say, "that an injunction
is not granted to restrain a mere trespass, where the injury is
not irreparable and destructive to the plaintiff's estate; but, is
susceptible of perfect pecuniary compensation, and for which
the party may obtain adequate satisfaction in the ordinary course
of law.
I thought it, therefore, quite manifest, that if the erection and
working a saw mill, in the immediate vicinity of the plaintiff's
furnace, and its dependent improvements exposed them, as al-
leged, to great hazard by fire, and if the destruction of wood
and timber, for making the road, would be so considerable as
to leave an insufficient supply upon the lands, as an appendage
to the furnace; and assuming, as I did then assume, that the
agreement between the parties gave the defendant no authority
for these acts, that a clear case was made out for an injunction.
It was a case of irreparable ruin to the property in the charac-
ter in which it had been held and enjoyed, and not susceptible
of perfect pecuniary compensation.
Much of the argument upon the motion to dissolve the in-
junction has turned upon the construction of the contract; and
I am free to confess, that there is much difficulty in putting an
interpretation upon it which will reconcile its various provisions
and make it conform to what may, reasonably, be supposed to
have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time it was
made.
Looking, exclusively, to the 5th article of the agreement,
and it would seem very clear, that'the defendant could make
no tram or other road, except for the transportation of mate-
rials to and from the furnace and mines; and yet, there are
other provisions, from which the inference is very strong, that
the right to make a road, by which the defendant could reach
a market, was intended to be reserved to him. He had a right,
for example, to mine and sell minerals and materials to other
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