GEORGES CREEK COMPANY VS. DETMOLD. 37&

not authorize the defendant to erect a saw mill, in the particu-
lar location selected for it, nor to make a rail or tram road, and
to cut wood and timber for the purpose upon the lands of the
plaintiff, to connect with the road of the Maryland Mining Com-
pany. These grounds were, the danger to which the furnace
and its dependant improvements would be exposed from fire,
by the erection and working of the saw mill in their'immediate
vicinity; and the destruction of wood and timber to such an
extent, as to leave the lands without an adequate supply for its
purposes, as an appendage to the furnace.

It seemed to me very clear, that in whatever light the defend-
ant might be viewed, whether as a mere stranger and trespass-
er, or whether there was privity of title between him and the
complainant, the acts complained of were of that irreparably
ruinous and destructive character, as to call for the preventive
interposition of this court. There was a period, to be sure,
when the courts were extremely reluctant, if not absolutely un-
willing to interfere at all, as against a mere trespasser, however
grievous the injury might be, upon the ground, as observed by
Lord Thurlow, that the defendant being a mere stranger, might
be turned out of the possession immediately.

But, there seems now to be no hesitation, whatever, to inter-
fere, by injunction, even as against trespassers, if the acts done
or threatened to the property would be ruinous and irremedia-
ble. 2 Story's Equity, secs. 928, 929; Eden on Injunctions,
193.

Chancellor Kent says, in Jerome vs. Ross, 7 Johns, Ch, Rep.,
333, that the common law remedy by action and the assessment
of damages by a jury, is, in ordinary cases of trespass, found to
be amply sufficient for the protection of property; and, that it
was not advisable to introduce the chancery remedy, by injunc-
tion, and to call forth the power of the court, by attachment,
fine and imprisonment, except in strong and aggravated in-
stance of trespass, which go to the destruction of the inheritance,
or where the mischief is remediless. He further observed, in
the same case, that it is not sufficient, that the act be simply
per se a trespass; but, it must be a case of mischief, and of ir-