MALCOM VS. HALL. 177

to the full weight of an answer in chancery under other circum-
stnnces, it is, nevertheless, quite sufficient to put the complain-
ant upon the proof of the allegations of his bill, and it is for
him to show, that when the grantor executed this deed, he had
no reasonable expectation of being exempted from liability,
or execution for or on account of his debts, without applying for
the benefit of the insolvent laws.

It is true, as was decided by the Court of Appeals in the case
of Dutany vs. Hoffman, 7 G. & J., 170, the intent, in cases of
this description, may be established by facts and circumstances,
as in other cases, and that proximity between the date of the
assignment, and the application for the benefit of the law, is a
circumstance worthy of consideration in connection with the
other facts and circumstances in the case. But the other facts
and circumstances of this case are so essentially different from
those which are found in the case referred to, that it is impos-
sible to suppose the court would have come to the same conclu-
sion in this, as in that. Here, the creditors are all put on a foot-
ing of entire equality; there, a preference was given, unsolicit-
ed, to a few favored creditors, at the expense of the rest, with-
out any attempt whatever to conciliate or adjust their claims
against them. It was with reference to one party thus volun-
tarily preferring one creditor to the other, that the Court of Ap-
peals say, he could have had no reasonable expectation of being
exempted from liability, on account of debts due the injured
creditors, except by an application for the benefit of the insolv-
ent laws.

If, therefore, the decision of this case depended upon the ex-
istence of such expectations—that is, if the existence of such
an expectation on the part of the grantor in this deed would
render it invalid, I would still be unwilling to set it aside; be-
cause, looking to the provisions of the deed, and seeing their
justice, and the good reason which the grantor may reasonably
have entertained, that his creditors would acquiesce in it, I
should have been strongly inclined to think, that he did expect
exemption from their claims against him, without having re-
course to the insolvent laws for relief. But as I have already