176 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

that one of the objects of it, was to bring involuntary transfers
of property, by a debtor to his creditor, which the Court of
Appeals had declared to be without, within the provisions of
our insolvent system, as applicable to the city and county of
Baltimore.

This law effected two alterations in the system, so far as the
city and county of Baltimore are concerned. In the first place,
it invalidated the transfer whether made upon request or not, and
thus in future rendered the decision in the case of Crawfords
and Sellman vs. Taylor ineffectual within the limits of the city
and county of Baltimore. And in the next, no such transfer
could be made in favor of one creditor to the prejudice of the rest,
if the debtor making it shall have had no reasonable expecta-
tion of being exempted from liability or execution for or on ac-
count of his debts, without applying for the benefit of the insolvent
laws. Thus dispensing with one of the prerequisites to the
successful impeachment of such a preference—that it should
have been made with a view, or under an expectation of taking
the benefit of the insolvent laws. Substituting the reasonable
expectation of such an alternative, for the direct purpose of
taking the benefit of the insolvent laws.

But still, under the act of 1834, the transfer or assignment
of the debtor cannot be successfully assailed, unless it appears
that it was made "with a view to the advantage or security of,
and with intent tu prefer any creditor or creditors, security or
securities."

There must, under this act, as it seems to me, be found in
the transfer or assignment, an intention to prefer one creditor
or security over another, or notwithstanding the party may have
had no reasonable expectation of escaping a recourse to the
insolvent laws for relief, the transfer or assignment will stand.

[The Chancellor then proceeded to state the facts of the case,
and after alluding to the answer of the defendant, he continues :J

Now, although this answer, as it does not speak of matters
within the personal knowledge of the respondent, is not entitled