under which the condemnation was made, are in full force, it is
proposed by a collateral proceeding to take from them, their
property, upon the allegation, that it was acquired by an abuse
of their chartered privileges. My decided conviction is, that
this cannot be done, and that the complainant, having failed to
show cause against the condemnation at the proper time, is
not now at liberty, to dispute its validity, or necessity.

If by applying this property to a purpose not warranted by
the charter, the company have exposed themselves to the pen-
alty of a forfeiture, and to all the consequences which would
ensue from such forfeiture, the complainant is not the party,
nor is this the proceeding by which the question is to be tried.

But as already observed, the complainant is clearly entitled
to be paid the compensation awarded him by the jury, and I
cannot think that his right to such payment can be in any way
affected by the act of 1841, ch. 168, before referred to.

But the complainant, besides praying for the payment of the
sums awarded him by the jury, as damages for the comdemna-
tion of this land, asks that his equitable lien as vendor, may be
enforced, and that the land may be sold for die satisfaction
thereof. How far the complainant may be entitled to the lien
of a vendor to enforce payment of the purchase money, is a
question not free from difficulty. He did not agree to sell the
land, and the proceeding adopted by the company under the
15th section of the act of 1826, ch. 123, became necessary in
consequence of the failure of the parties to agree. By that
proceeding the land was taken from him without fais consent,
and of course there was no contract to sell. It was a con-
demnation or dedication of so much of the property of an in-
dividual for the public use, taken in virtue of the right of emi-
nent domain; but upon the condition that a just compensation
should be made to the owner. Whether, under these circum-
stances, the equitable lien of the vendor exists, or not, is a
question of no easy solution; but looking to the language of
the act, and indeed independently of any such language, it
must be conceded, that the property cannot be taken from the
complainant until the valuation placed upon it by the jury is