HO HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

condemnation of property, necessary to the construction and
repair of the road is concerned, is confessedly made a part
of the charter of this company, directs that these inquisitions
shall describe the property taken, or the bounds of the land
condemned, &c., these inquisitions, thus describing the prop-
erty, or the bounds of the land condemned, are directed by the
same section^ to be returned by the sheriff, to the clerk of the
county, and by him to be filed, and unless sufficient cause to the
contrary is shown, the court is directed to confirm the inquisi-
tion at the next ensuing session.

All this was done in the present case. The property con-
.demned was described in the inquisition, which was returned
to the clerk of the proper county court, was by him filed, and
no cause to the contrary having been shown, the inquisition
was duly confirmed by the court, and recorded by the clerk,
as directed by the statute. These proceedings took place m
year 1838, from which time to the filing of this bill, in 1846,
they have remained without objection from any quarter. It
seems to me, impossible to contend successfully, that under
these circumstances, and in this incidental collateral proceeding,
the propriety of the condemnation, and use of this property, can
be drawn in question.

A cause of forfeiture of a charter of incorporation, cannot
certainly be taken advantage of collaterally, or incidentally. It
must be enforced by scire facias or quo warranto, at the in-
stance of the government, and until the government so interferes
the franchise continues.

Cawl Company vs. Rail Road Company, 4 G. & J., 1, and
as the charter of the company cannot be forfeited, unless pro-
ceedings for that purpose be instituted by the government, I
am at a loss to conceive how their property can be taken from
them as forfeited, so long as the charter remains in existence.
By the condemnation of the property in question, and thp confir-
mation of that condemnation by the county court, it has been
ascertained by the proper authority that such property was re-
quired for the purposes of the company. And yet whilst that
judgment stands, and the corporate franchises of the company,