HEPBURN'S CASE.—3 BLAND. 92

It is true that a mere formal plea of the Statute of Limitations
has been, in some cases, said by Courts of common law, not to be
a plea to the merits. But a reliance upon the presumption arising
from a great lapse of time has never been considered in Chancery
as a defence of the same rigid and technical character. The
Statute of Limitations, in equity as at law, must always be pleaded
or specially relied on as a defence; but a presumption founded on
a long lapse of time is a defence, which has always been allowed
* to be made at the hearing or trial as a matter of substance
arising out of the whole case, and which it was not necessary 111
specially to advance, and rely on in any previous stage of the pro-
ceedings, to enable the party to have the benefit of it. Because,
independently of all positive enactments, there must be a period
of time after which every latent or inactive claim to property must
be presumed to have been radically detective in its origin, or to
have been, in some way or other, completely satisfied. It is ask-
ing.too much, to require, amidst the mutations of human affairs,
and the perishable nature of all things, that the evidences of the
right of property should be carefully preserved through a long and
indefinite period of time. Shipbrooke v. Hinchingbrook, 13 Ves.
396. A presumption of right and of the correctness of a state of
things sanctioned by a long series of years is necessary to the
peace of society. Sherman v. Sherman, 2 Vern. 276; Prince v. Hey-
lim, 1 Atk. 494; Sturt v. Hellish, 2 Atk. 610; Smith v. Clay, 3 Bro.
C. C. 639, note; Hercy v. Dinwoody, 4 Bro. C. C. 258; Cholmondeley
v. Clinton, 2 Jac. & Walk. 140; Stevenson v. Howard, 3 H. & J. 554;
Hillary v. Waller, 12 Ves. 205.

The rule, nullum tempus occur it regt, even in favor of the crown
in England, has been as to many cases abolished, or overruled.
Co. Litt. 119. n. 1; Com. Dig. Tit. Prerogative, (D. 86;) Bac. Abr.
Tit. Prerogative, E. 6; 3 Blac. Com. 307; The Attorney-General v.
Richards, 2 Anstr. 615: Simpson v. Gutteridge, 1 Mad. Rep. 610;
Roe v. Ireland, 11 East. 280; Goodtitle v. Baldwin, 11 East, 488;
Nimmo v. The Commonwealth, 4 Hen. & Mun. 70; The Mayor of
Hull v. Horner, Cowp. 108. In Maryland, the Lord Proprietary
was always held to be bound by the Statute of Limitations, Kelly
v. Greenfield, 2 H. & McH. 138; and the Republic, since the Revo-
lution, has not only never, in any case, that I know of, claimed an
exemption from it; but has expressly subjected her rights to its op-
eration under circumstances where the propriety of doing so might
well have been questioned. 1818, ch. 90; 1839, ch. 34. The Re-
public, in this instance, claims the application of no rule to which
she herself is unwilling to submit, Cockey v. Smith, 3 H. & 3. 2G;
and therefore may well rely upon a presumption which is necessary
to the peace of all, and which forms an important and essential
principle in every code of jurisprudence.