HEPBURN'S CASE.—3 BLAND. 91

It is, however, clear, that although a bill of exchange may be
made payable at any length of time after sight, yet if it be not
accepted, suit may be brought against the drawer and endorser
before the day of payment arrives; and the drawer may, on being
notified of the non-acceptance, proceed forthwith by suit against
the drawee to recover his effects out of his hands, upon which the
bill was drawn. It is, therefore, perfectly manifest that the draw-
ing of the bill could not have, in any way, prevented Hepburn
from collecting his debt from the Mollisons. It may be admitted,
that he was excusable in not proceeding against them until he
heard the fate of his bill: but certainly after being notified of its
non-acceptance, further indulgence could not have been expected
by the Mollisons themselves. And the further delay of the execu-
tor cannot but be considered as a great neglect of the interests of
the creditors and next of kin of his testator. So far, therefore,
from this transaction of the bill of exchange furnishing any reason-
able apology for that delay of about thirteen years, the executor
can be relieved from the imputation of gross negligence in no
other way than by shewing, what 1 believe to be the truth, that he
actually did receive payment, as stated by himself, on the 12th of
January, 1779, of £260, and obtained assignments for the balance
sometime in or before the year 1790.

* Upon the first branch of the case I am of opinion that 109
there is sufficient evidence to shew that this debt, once due
to the estate of the late John Hepburn, has been long since paid
and satisfied by the Mollisons themselves. And I might here
safely rest the case; but a sense of duty to the State, and a respect
for the apparent sincerity and zeal with which the claim has been
pressed by the petitioner, induce me to proceed with the investi-
gation in relation to its being barred by the statutory provision,
by which it is said to be embraced, and by the presumption of sat-
isfaction arising from the great lapse of time.

These terms of opposition are founded on the supposition that
there is no direct proof that the debt has been fully paid. And in
proceeding upon that supposition, one of three positions must be
taken; first, that no partial payment has been made, in which case
the presumption of payment must begin to run from the first of
April, 1776, when the whole debt became due; or secondly, that
there has been a part payment made of £260, which being in itself
an acknowledgment of the debt on the 12th of January, 1779, when
it was made, the estimate of the presumption must commence from
that day; but if, in the last place, as has been urged, the entry as
to the £260 must not be considered as a payment, then there being-
no payment but that of the assignments in the year 1790, the pre-
sumption of satisfaction can only rest on the lapse of time since
that period.