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80 HEPBURN'S CASE.—3 BLAND.
equity and right of the matter, which decision shall be conclusive
in the premises; and if the Chancellor shall find any sum to be
due, the same shall be satisfied out of the funds arising from the
confiscation and sale of the property of the said William and
96
* Robert Mollison, which may remain in the treasury unap-
propriated. And on the part of the State, it shall be the duty of
the Attorney-General, or one of his deputies, to attend the inves-
tigation. 1828, No. 26.
BLAND, C., 16th December, 1830.—This case standing ready for
hearing, and the solicitors of the petitioner and the Attorney-Gen-
eral having committed their several arguments to writing, they
with the proceedings were read and considered.
In England, as in this instance, jurisdiction is frequently given
to the Chancellor by private or special Acts of Parliament; and in
all such cases he adheres strictly to the special authority so given.
2 Mad. Chaw. 719; Mitf. Plea. 31. Here too, the Chancellor has
always held himself bound to follow the authority exactly as given
to the full extent of the constitutional competency of the General
Assembly to confer any such authority. But in this case the soli-
citors of the petitioner and the Attorney-General differ materially
as to the meaning of this resolution.
On the part of the petitioner it is contended, that the Legisla-
ture meant, that neither the lapse of time should be relied on as a
defence; nor that the technical rules of equity which prevail be-
tween individuals should be applied to the case.
On the other hand the Attorney-General insists, that all the sub-
stantial principles of equity by which a similar controversy between
individuals would be governed, should applied to this case.
This difference as to the intention of the Legislature, renders it
necessary to determine, in the first place, what are the principles
by which the Chancellor is to be governed; since it is obvious,
that the general complexion of the investigation, as well as the final
judgment, must altogether, or very much depend upon the circum-
stance, from which of those positions he sets out. And, therefore,
this preliminary question must be disposed of before the case itself
can be considered.
It may be safely assumed, as well settled, that all our govern-
ments are, in their nature, delegations of power, that they are
trusts exercised for the use and benefit of a sovereign people; and
that the governments of the States, though less limited than that
of the Union, yet have their general as well as their special limita-
tions. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386. And therefore, it may well be
doubted whether the General Assembly of this State can, consti-
tutionally, make any capricious or arbitrary disposition of the
money or property of the * Republic; or can be allowed to
97
indulge their feelings of benevolence in bestowing such
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