CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE.—3 BLAND. 649

continuance impracticable, it must be then terminated; and the
only remedy of him who wished its continuance, is upon the con-
tract for a compensation in damages for the injury he has hereby
sustained. Skinner.v. Dayton, 19 John. 538. A partnership for a
definite period may be determined before the specified time has
elapsed, either by the act of God, as by the death or the habitual
mental insanity of one of the partners; or of the government, as
by a declaration of war between the countries of the parties; Gra-
wold v. Waddington, 15 John. 57; or it may be terminated by the
misfortune, or by the illegal or fraudulent conduct of a partner, as
by his insolvency or bankruptcy. The partnership is held to be thus
absolutely terminated; because it is deemed unjust, that the sur-
viving or solvent partner should have a stranger intruded upon him
in place of him in whom he had confided, and with whom he bad,
therefore, associated himself; and also, because it would be in a
great degree or altogether impracticable to continue the partner-
ship after such an event, upon the terms on which it was originally
formed. Collyer Part. 58; Marquand v. The New York Manufactur-
ing Company, 17 John. 52.5.

Here the association, constituted of Richard Caton, John Gibson
and others, have virtually refused to continue the partnership the
had formed with Lechleitner and Troost any longer, by transferring
all their estate to a newly erected body called the Cape Sable
Company; and by taking upon themselves the capacities of that
body politic they have virtually and effectually cast off all connexion
with their former partners Lechleitner and Troost. Bethel Church
v. Donnom, 1 Desau, 154. By an express provision of the Act of
incorporation, by which they have *been clothed with this
new capacity, it is declared, that nothing therein contained 675
should exempt any member, or members of the company from any
liability iu his, her, or their individual capacity for or on account
of any contract or contracts theretofore made.

Hence it is manifest, that their liabilities in their mutual capaci-
ties, as the association of Richard Caton, John Gibson and others,
were to be in no way impaired, or in any manner blended with
those of their new and artificial one called the Cape Sable Com-
pany. The two being absolutely distinct, and being intended to
be kept entirely so. The contracts of the association separately
or of the association together with their partners Lechleitner and
Troost, could have, of themselves, no connexion whatever with
those of the Cape Sable Company. 1 Fonb. Eq. 308; Dame v.
Girdler, 1 New Rep. 35. And besides this body politic, as a new
and artificial stranger, could not be intruded upon Lechleitner and
Troost as a partner in place of the association of Richard Caton,
John Gibson and others, with whom they had connected them-
selves. It is not only an artificial stranger to the partnership