CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE.—3 BLAND. 641

McH. 407; Coombs v. Jordan, ante. 321; and yet it was never
doubted here, that a judgment rendered in the General Court gave
rise to a lien upon the defendant's lands in every count v of the
State.

But according to these laws, in those cases where the suit could
be brought no where else than in the Court of the county in which
the defendant resided; and, in all other cases where it was in fact
brought there, all the process of the County Court, being, by the
general principles of the common law, confined within its local
limits, it followed, as a necessary consequence, that no property of
the defendant, not to be found within such county, could be taken
in execution, in satisfaction of such a judgment; and therefore,
that no judgment of a County Court could operate as a lien upon
any of the lands of the defendant lying out of that particular
county; unless there was here, as in England, some means of re-
moving the judgment into some superior Court from which a more
general and comprehensive scope of executive process might be
taken.

It seems to be not altogether improbable, that some such course
of proceeding, at one time, might have been allowed aud pursued
here. For, it is declared, by one of the Provincial Acts of Assem-
bly , that when any person against whom any judgment shall be
given, in any County Court, shall fly, remove, or absent himself
out of the jurisdiction of that Court, that then the plaintiff, for
the more easy obtaining of the fruit of such judgment, may take
the transcript of the record of such judgment, under the seal of
the Court, and Jay the same before the County Court where the
defendant shall happen to be, which transcript shall be entered
upon the records of such County Court, who shall award execution
thereon by a capias ad satisfaciendum, fieri facias, or attachment
for the debt, damages, and costs, together with the additional
costs of such Court, "without suing out any writ of scire facias."
1715, ch. 41, s. 8, probably re-enacted from 1701, ch. 1. From
which last expression, dispensing with a scire facias, it would
* seem to be allowable to infer, that some such practice had 666
prevailed here, as in England, as that of removing a judg-
ment from a County Court to the General Court, and suing out
a acire facias for the purpose of obtaining an execution from that
Court, as upon its own judgment. 2 Inst. 23; Guilliam v. Hardy,
1 Ld. Raym. 216.

But however that may have been, it is clear, that no execution,
of any kind, could be issued under this Act upon any judgment
rendered in a County Court, and be executed in another county,
or made returnable into another County Court, unless in pursuit of
a defendant who had himself given a proper foundation fur such
a course of proceeding by flying, removing, or absenting himself
41 3 B.