CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE—3 BLAND. 633

as rendered an equal and equitable distribution of its estate among
its creditors proper and necessary. Hence it is clear, in this as in
every other similar case of a creditor's suit, that neither the plain-
tiff, nor those who come in under the decree, can now be allowed
to draw in question and again put in issue any claim of any credi-
tor whose claim has been thus established; except upon the ground
of fraud and collusion of the then parties.

Here, however, these plaintiffs now again, and Lechleitner
and others, who have come in under this decree, as creditors of
the Cape Sable Company, have, by their exceptions to the audi-
tor's report, not only denied the validity of these claims of Oliver
and Carroll as judgment creditors, but have also denied that they
cau be considered as creditors of that company at all, or to any
amount. But these matters have been heretofore put in issue;
and, after a full investigation have been finally and by consent ad-
judicated upon; and therefore, must now be considered as en-
tirely at rest; since, if it were otherwise, there would be no end to
litigation.

But although it has been finally established, that Oliver and
Carroll are to be considered as judgment creditors; yet as it has
not been distinctly declared oil which of their judgments they
shall be compelled to rest their claim, it will be necessary now to
ascertain that, in order to determine how they are to take rank in
relation to each other.

It appears, that Oliver's first judgment was obtained on the 9th
of December, 1822, in Anne Arundel County Court: and that its
execution was stayed by an injunction from this Court; for causes
explained in the orders of the 21st of April, 1823, and the 7th
of May. 1824; and becan.se of its having been obtained in the
Court of a county not the proper residence of the Cape Sable
Company.

As to what may be deemed the residence of a corporation, it
may be well to recollect, that, as no government can give to its
laws any extra-territorial operation, all bodies politic must neces-
sarily be considered as artificial beings oi that country by whose
government they were incorporated; and alien entities in all other
countries; that a corporation may, in the country of its origin,
have a fixed locality and residence, from its nature and the terms
of its creation; as a city, town, &c. And that all corporations;
such as banks, &c. which are transitory in their nature; and which
* are not limited to anyplace by the terms, and nature of
their creation and objects, may be considered as domiciled, 657
for some purposes, in that county of the State, by the government of
which they have been created, where they transact their business;
and for other purposes in that county in which their property is
held. 2 Inst. 703: Rex v. Gardner, Cowp. 83: Society, &c. v. Wheeler,
2 Gall. 131. It is said, that the name of a body politic is sometimes