CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE.—3 BLAND. 617

to sell under the original levy, which remains unbroken; or to
have him commanded to make a sale of it by a venditioni exponas.
Bond v. Cooper, 6 November, 1826.—Per BLAND, Chancellor. I
cannot conceive, that this Act of Assembly which directs the per-
sonal property to be re-delivered, will admit of being so construed
as in any manner to impair the sheriff's right to his poundage fees.
Its avowed object was to relieve him from his responsibility as the
keeper of perishable property; and to benefit the defendant by
delivering it back to him. In other respects the sheriff's right to
his fees remains unaffected.

From these views of the subject I feel satisfied, that the sheriff's
right to poundage fees has not been, in any manner, shaken by
the mere interposition of the injunction. According to the ancient
course the Court would not have discharged either the person or
the property of the defendant front the custody of the sheriff under
the execution, but upon the express condition, that his poundage
fees should be paid or secured; Franklyn v. Thomas, 3 Meriv. 234;
and the alterations made by the Acts of Assembly go no further
than to prevent the sheriff from holding the person or selling the
personalty taken in execution as a means of obtaining payment of
his fees.

But this suit was instituted, and the injunction obtained by a
corporator of the Cape Sable Company, as complainant against
that body politic, and the plaintiffs in the executions as defend-
ants; and they have, by a special agreement, consented to a decree
directing the whole of the property of this corporation to be sold.
It is therefore this decree which has thus left this sheriff in the
possession of a complete legal right without any means whatever
at law of having it satisfied. If the injunction had been dissolved
the sheriff might, as we have seen, have proceeded, under the
levy he had made upon the land of this company, to make sale of
it to satisfy his poundage, fees; but the decree has deprived him
of the right to do so.

The plaintiffs in the executions cannot be permitted to consent
to a decree, or in any manner to produce a sale of the defendant's
* property under an authority different from that of the 639
executions they had caused to be issued, and levied by the
sheriff, so as to deprive Mm of his poundage fees. Such a course
of proceeding by those plaintiffs, to the prejudice of the sheriff,
would be a fraud' upon him, which I find no ground to impute to
them from any of their manifested intentions. Their consent to
the decree for a sale must, therefore, be considered as an implied
admission, that the sheriff's right should not be affected by it; and
that his fees should be first satisfied out of the proceeds of the
sale made under the decree.

Then as to the Cape Sable Company, and its several corpora-
tors, who were clearly liable in their politic capacity, they could