CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE.—3 BLAND. 611

It has been urged, that the sheriff has a lien upon the property
taken in execution, for his poundage fees. But it is no where di-
rectly said, that he has any such lien upon the property taken,
either as against the plaintiff or the defendant; or that he has a
right to hold it in any way until his fees are paid. Yet the allow-
ance of such a, lien, so far as it does not conflict with the rights of
others, or that superintending control necessary to the due admin-
istration of justice would seem to be entirely reasonable, and sus-
tainable upon principles analogous to those on which tradesmen
and officers are allowed to have a lien upon property in their pos-
session to secure the payment of their compensation and fees.
But such a common law lieu can only exist as an associate with
possession; it begins and cuds with possession. Seln: N. P. 1286.

In this case the petitioner, having been lawfully and completely
divested of the possession of all the property he had taken in exe-
cution, he certainly can have no lien, according to the common
law, upon it, or its proceeds, which the Court is now about to dis-
tribute. And there is not the slightest ground to maintain, that a
sheriff has a general lien on the property taken by him in execu-
tion, like the lien of the State upon the property of its debtors, or
a plaintiff's judicial lieu, as on a judgment at law, or a lieu ac-
cording to the civil law which follows the property on which it has

* once fastened, through every change, and into all other 632
hands. The petitioner, theieibre. cannot sustain his pre-
tensions upon any foundation of this kind. Ridyely v. lglehart,
ante, 540.

In the case under consideration, it is necessary to ascertain
whether the plaintiffs or the defendants in these executions are
liable to the sheriff lor his poundage fees; and the principles upon
which that liability rests.

This Court has, in many instances, where it has money in its
hands which it is about to pay over to a party who is liable no
further than to the amount of such assets; or who is not a resident
of the State, and within the reach of common law process, allowed
a creditor of such a party to come in and obtain payment of his
merely legal claim out of the assets or money of his debtor in this
Court. It seemed to be admitted, and indeed I do not see how it
could be denied, that if the plaintiffs in those executions only were
liable for these poundage fees, that there could not. from any
thing alleged or shewn by the petitioner, be the slightest pretext
for this Court to enteitain jurisdiction of his case, as he has
against them an ample remedy at law. Because it is not shewn,
that these proceeds are specifically bound for those fees, or that
they are assets in respect of which those plaintiffs are chargeable;
or that those plaintiffs are insolvent, or non-residents, and beyond

the reach of ordinary common law process. There is, therefore,