NEALE v. HAGTHROP.—3 BLAND. 563

case the usual general traverse, denying the truth of all the un-
answered allegations of the bill, has not been added by way of
conclusion to any of the answers.

The late Chancellor HANSON is, however, reported to have said,
that " no person acquainted with the laws, or rules, or practice of
this Court, would conceive it the meaning of the Chancellor, that
whatever matter stated in a bill is not denied, must be considered
as admitted. No! if interrogatories stated in a bill are not
answered, the complainant has a right to except to the answer;
and, if the interrogatories are proper, the defendant will be com-
pelled to answer plainly, fully and explicitly. If then any mate-
rial matter, charged in the complainant's bill, has been neither
denied nor admitted by the answer, it stands on the hearing of
the cause for nought. This assuredly every lawyer will admit."
Hopkins v. Slump, 2 H. & J. 304.

But to rhe latter part of what is here said I have found myself
unable to assent; and, therefore, I deemed it a respect due to the
memory of my predecessor to set down the authorities and rea-
sons which have led me to a different conclusion. From all that
has been said upon the subject, it appears to be agreed on all
hands, that tlse plaintiff, being entitled to an answer to each ma-
terial allegation of his bill, may except to an answer which omits
to respond to any of them; that, in England and Virginia, the
plaintiff', by a certain prescribed mode of proceeding, may have
the unanswered allegations taken for true; but, if he omits to take
that course, for that purpose, ami goes to hearing, he must then
prove the truth of the unanswered allegatious, or they will be dis-
regarded; that, according to Chancellor HANSON, the unanswered
allegations stand on the hearing of the case for nought; and, that
in my opinion all material allegations of the bill, as to which
the answer is entirely silent, are, on the hearing, to be taken pro
confesso. (k)

A fifth general rule is. that where an answer, in the body of it,
purports to be an auswer to the whole bill, but the respondent

(k) In the case of Warfield v. Gambrill, 1 G. & J. 510, it has been since laid
down by the Court of Appeals, that "supposing there is no denial of title in
the answer, and that the material allegation in the bill, the seisin of the
complainant is unanswered, this is clearly no admission of any unanswered
fact." Chancellor HANSON, 2 B.. & 3. 301, says, if any material matter
charged in the complainant's bill, has been neither denied nor admitted by
the answers, it stands on the hearing of the cause for nought; and in Young
v. Grundy, 6 Cranch, 51, Ch. J. Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the
Court says, "that if the answer neither admitb nor denies the allegations of
the bill, they must be proved upon the final hearing. Upon a question of
dissolution of an injunction, they are to be taken as true.'' " A respondent
submitting to answer must answer fully, but if the answer be defective, and
insufficient to meet the allegations and interrogatories of the bill, the com-
plainant, desiring a fuller response, much except to the answer. If he do