NEALE v, HAGTHROP.—3 BLAND. 561

service of a decree nisi. Thompson v. Strode, 2 Hen. & Munf. 19;
Lcgrand v. Ftancisco, 3 Mww. 83. And it has also been held, in
that State, that where some of the allegations of the bill were not
answered, the plaintiff might except to the answer as insufficient,
or move to have the unanswered part of the bill taken for con-
fessed. But, if * he does neither, it must be proved, and he
shall not, on the trial, avail himself of any implied adiuis- **1&
siou by the defendant; for where the defendant does not answer
at all, the plaintiff cannot take his bill for confessed, without an
order of Court to that effect, and ha\iug it served on the defend-
ant; and this is the only evidence of his admission. Of course,
if this mode of proceeding, as to the confession of the whole bill,
be correct, it must be equally correct as to any part. Jopling v.
Stuart, 4 Ves. 619; Dangcrjield v. Claiborne, 2 Hen. & Mun. 17;
Thompson v. Strode, 2 Hen. & Mun. 19; Coleman v. Lync^ 4 Rand.
456; Young v. Oritndy, 6 Cran. 51.

Such is the rule as to the Chancery Courts of England and Vir-
ginia. The default in not making any answer at all, and that of
not answering all the allegations of the bill are precisely alike in
kind, differing only in degree; hence the Courts of England, and
of that State have applied the same rule, in spirit and principle,
to both defaults. The partj is allowed to pursue the same course
to have his bill, either wholly or partially taken pro cow/mo, ac-
cording to the extent of the defendant's default.

In this State, no decree nisi is ever entered and served on a de-
fendant who has not answered; but an absolute decree may be
entered at once, so soon as he can be fixed with the deiault; which
can be at any time after the limited period for answering has
elapsed, or when he has elected to make and has actually filed his
answers to the bill. The principle aud reason of the English and
Virginia rule, aud that of Maryland, are the same in relation to a
partial answer. The Courts in each following the spirit of the
established or legislative rule, which directs the mode of proceed-
ing in case the defendant puts in no answer at all.

The plaintiff is entitled to an answer to each allegation of his
bill, either because he cannot prove the facts, or to aid his proof,
or to avoid expense. If the answer be insufficient he may except
to it; which has been compared to a demurrer at law for want of
form. The sole object of exceptions is to extract from the defend-
ant a more full and perfect disclosure for the benefit of the plain-
tiff. They are never meaut, nor intended, nor are they calculated
to benefit the defendant, or to put him upon his guard in any
respect whatever. The plaintiff may waive his right to except;
aud it is always advisable to do so, where his proofs are ample
and at hand; and the character or conduct of the defendant
* indicates, that he is not altogether trustworthy upon oath; ° ' '
for, in such case the plaintiff will attain his object much sooner
36 3B.