550 NEALE v. HAGTHROP.—3 BLAND.

tels, and credits, which his letters authorize him to administer;
that is, the chattels real and personal property of his intestate,
which may be now shewn to remain undisposed of by either of the
previous administrators, John or Mary; or which have been and
continue to be held unaccounted for by any one as trustee or agent
of the late Anthony Hook, his intestate. The statements and alle-
gations of these original and amended bills must, therefore, be
taken subject to the limited rights of the representative character
of this plaintiff.

It appears that some of the next of kin of the late Anthony
Hook, under an impression, that the chattels real of the deceased,
had vested absolutely in them, have disposed of, or attempted to
make a final disposition of the whole, as if such chattels real had
been immediately cast into their hands by the mere operation of
law, in like manner as the real estate of an intestate is at once cast
upon his heirs. If these next of km acquired, at once, by the act
of the law alone, a legal right to these chattels real, by virtue of
which they might, either concurrently with or independently of the
administrator, dispose of them; then, as the joint or independent
holders of the property in controversy, they ought to have been
made parties to this suit. And, if they have acquired such a legal
right, and have actually disposed of these chattels, then, it is no
less evident, that all claim against these deiendants is, so far, en-
tirely at an end. In these points of view the allegations of the
bill in relation to these next of kin of the intestate, present some
important preliminary inquiries.

*The real estate of an intestate devolves at once and en-
564 tirely upon his heirs by the mere operation of law. But his
personal property is, by the law itself, cast upon no one; nor does the
legal ownership of it vest immediately in any person. Such a legal
title can only vest in an administrator, who alone is considered as
the legal representative of the intestate as to his chattels real and
personal estate. In the interval between the death of the intestate
and the granting of administration, the legal right to the personal
property is in the keeping of the law. During that interval there
is no one who can sue or be sued for it; so that a person who
had, after the death of the intestate, obtained possession of his
personal property, could not have it quieted or matured into a
right by the lapse of any length of time, even as much as forty
years uninterrupted possession, before the granting of letters of
administration; because, the Statute of Limitations could not be
allowed to operate at all until the legal title was vested in some
one; and there was a person lawfully clothed with a capacity to
sue for, hold and dispose of such property. Stanford's Case, Cro.
Jac. 61; Jolliffe v. Pitt, 2 Vern. 695; Cary v. Stephenson, 2 Salk.
421; Murray v. The East India Company, 7 Com. Law Rep. 67; Fish-
wick v. Sewell, 4 H. & J. 394; Haslett v. Glenn, 1 H. & J. 17.