RIDGELY p. IGLEHART.—3 BLAND. 531

in which that benefit may be obtained, depend upon principles of
law and circumstances so various, that it is always indispensably
necessary carefully to attend to those particulars by which its very
substance may be materially affected. For all the purposes of the
present inquiry, however, hens may be regarded as of two kinds;
such as are sustained by the principles of common law or of equity
upon the peculiar circumstances of the case; or such as arise out
of positive legislative enactment; but all liens are essentially dif-
ferent from that priority of satisfaction, the right to which is given
by Act of Congress to the United States. The United States v.
Fisher, 2 Cran. 358; Conrad v. The Atlantic Insurance Company, 1
Peters, 386.

A lieu given by the common law for the benefit of trade, and the
like, such as that by which a factor may hold the goods of his
principal, or that by which an innkeeper may detain the goods of
his guest, &c., until he is paid, is always associated witli posses-
sion. *It begins and ends with possession; for it is only
upon property in the possession, and while it actually con- 543
tinues in the possession of such a creditor, that any such lieu
attaches. Jacobs v. Latour, 15 Com. Law Rep. 388. If the pos-
session be lost, or be suffered to remain ever so long unproductive
it cannot be regained, or made beneficial by any judicial proceed-
ing: because such a lien is only a mode of enforcing satisfaction
by the mere passive holding of the creditor, and thus preventing
the debtor from deriving any benefit from his own until he renders
justice where it is due. It is a sort of distringas to which certain
creditors may have recourse without the previous -sanction of a
Court of justice. But the principles upon which this liea is
founded, can afford no illustration or support to that claimed by
this plaintiff.

The specific lien of a mortgage arises out of the express and
special nature of the contract of mortgage itself; and, owing to
its peculiar nature falls almost exclusively within the jurisdiction
of a Court of equity. But the doctrines in relation to this species
of lien, it is evident, can have no bearing upon this case.

Under the civil and maritime law there are many instances of
what is called privileged creditors, whose claims are allowed to
operate as a lien upon certain property which has been erected,
saved, or benefited by their labor. By a lien of this kind, the
ship herself is bound to the material men by whom she has been
repaired, to the seamen by whom she has been navigated on the
high seas, &c. And such creditors may obtain the benefit of their
lien by proceeding against the ship alone, without naming any
person as defendant, or the holder. But however analogous this
suit may appear to be to a proceeding in rem in the admiralty, the
principles of the civil or maritime lasv, by which the lien of a
privileged creditor is governed, can have no relation to this case.