HALL v. McPHERSON.—3 BLAND. 525

house, 6 T. R. 366; Nadin v. Battie, 5 East, 147. But, that all
property of the applicant, not mentioned in his schedule, shall
be subject to execution and attachment, in the same manner his
property was prior to his application, 1827, ch. 70, s. 8; (Some
other provisions have been since made in relation to insolvent
debtors in the City and County of Baltimore, by 1834, ch. 293.)

From which it appears, that the property of a debtor cannot here,
as in England, be placed under the insolvent law in any way by
the mere act of any of his creditors; that it can only be so dis-
posed of upon the voluntary application of the insolvent debtor
himself; and that the transfer, when so made, being less open to
question, because of its being voluntary, and in all respects as ab-
solute as an assignment under the bankrupt law of England, the
reason why an insolvent here should not be allowed to sue or be
made a party to a suit in relation to property, not then held by
him as trustee, or in right of another, and so transferred, is much
stronger than that which arises from an assignment under the
analogous provisions of the English bankrupt law. Collet v. Wol-
laston, 3 Bro. C. C. 228; Collins v. Shirley, 4 Cond. Cha. Rep. 592.
The English bankrupt law is, in general, administered upon the
principle, that there will be no surplus of the bankrupt's estate to
be returned to him; our insolvent law, in terms, proceeds upon the
same principle by expressly declaring, that its benefit is to be
granted only to those who, by reason of their misfortunes, are
unable wholly to pay their debts. 1805. ch. 110, s. 1. Neverthe-
less, under some circumstances, an insolvent here, like a bankrupt in
England, may be permitted to institute a suit, or be made a party
for his own protection, or for the purpose of detecting and pre-
venting the practice of fraud; or where the necessary relief can-
not be obtained according to the mode of proceeding prescribed
by the insolvent law. Bowser v. Hughes, 1 Anst. 101; King v.
Martin, 2 Ves. Jun. 641; Williams v. Kinder, 4 Ves. 387; Benfield
v. Solomons, 9 Ves. 83; Saxton v. Davis, 18 Ves. 81; Whitworth v.
Davis, 1 Ves. & B. 548; Lowndes v. Taylor, 1 Mad. Rep. 422; Mack-
worth v. Marshall, 5 Cowd. Cha. Rep. 157; Piercy v. Roberts, 6 Cond.
Cha. Rep. 469; Barton v. Jayne, 9 Cowd. Cha. Rep. 461.

* Hence it may be regarded as a general rule, that in all
cases where a debtor has, before the institution of a suit by537
or against him, been finally discharged under the insolvent law,
he cannot be allowed to sue or be made a party to a suit in respect
to any property which has been rightfully transferred in pursuance
of the insolvent law for the benefit of his creditors; because having
parted with all his interest therein, he has thereby divested him-
self of all capacity to sue or be sued in relation to any such prop-
erty. But where a debtor has, pending a suit to which he is a
party, been finally discharged under the insolvent law, other prin-