POST v. MACKALL.—3 BLAND. 515

the claimants No. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, relied on the Statute of Limita-
tations is bar of the claims No. 34, 35, 30 and 37.

But from what has been said in relation to these claims it ap-
pears, that although the claims No. 1, 2, 3, 5, 11, 14, 25 and 27,
may be benefited, they cannot be injured by the application of the
Statute of Limitations; that claim No. 4, on account of its priority
of lien; and claims No. 7, 30, and 31, because of their being alto-
gether excluded, cannot be, in any way, affected by the Statute of
Limitations; and, therefore, since no man can, without utility to
himself, be allowed capriciously to disappoint another of his just
rights, they cannot be permitted to rely on it, either as a pretext
for their own protection, or to the prejudice of any other claimant.
Consequently, in marshalling the assets, in reference to the Sta-
tute of Limitations, as relied on, these four claims No. 4, 7, 30 and
31, must be entirely laid aside.

The leading objects, in arranging these funds, are to produce
the greatest amount of satisfaction to each of the several credi-
tors, allowing to each his just rights; to give to the most active
those preferences aud advantages which the law always awards to
diligence; and to avoid any such conflict of interests as may pre-
vent a distribution of the whole in such manner as to leave any
one unsatisfied, so far as the assets will go, or as may deprive any
one of his due proportion. Therefore, if conflicting pleas of the
Statute of Limitations can be no otherwise adjusted, that which
has been first filed must be allowed first to operate; and where
pleas of the Statute of Limitations have been filed 'by different
creditors, on the same day, so as to have a countervailing opera-
tion against each other, they must both of them, so far as they so
operate, be rejected.

With regard to the account of the defendant Louis Mackall, as
administrator de bonis non, it is clear, that all taxes due on the
real estate of an intestate, at the time of his death, must be paid
by his administrator, as public charges entitled to a preference in
* satisfaction from his personal estate. But this adminis-

trator craves an allowance for taxes which have accrued 526
since the death of the intestate; but no such allowance can be
granted. As to the credit for $1.005, which the administrator in-
sists on having allowed to him, I have already spoken of it in con-
nexion with claim No. 5.

The personal estate of the deceased is to be regarded as an
aggregate amount of value. It cannot be culled and parcelled out
so as to leave that which is of little or no value to rest as an in-
cumbrance any where, or upon any one; but the whole must be so
disposed of as to produce a clear average or aggregate aruouut for
the benefit of all creditors first; and then for all who take after
them. If, as is alleged, in this instance, the personal estate be
composed in part of aged or infirm slaves, who are unable to main-