512 POST v. MACKALL.—3 BLAND.

as against the personalty, by an absolute judgment against the
administrator. It is, however, clear, that as all the parties to this
mortgage are before the Court; and the mortgaged property is
within the jurisdiction of the Court, it must be first applied, so
far a« it will go, in satisfaction of this claim No. 5. And that the
claimant, if not thus fully satisfied, must be allowed to come in
here, to the amount of the balance, for a due proportion with the
other * creditors, whose claims have the same grade and
522 authenticity. Hammond v. Hammond, 2 Bland, 384; Green-
wood v. Taylor, 4 Cond. Chan. Rep. 381. But as this personal prop-
erty so mortgaged came to the hands of the defendant Louis Mac-
kail as administrator de bom's non, he must be held accountable for
it; and can only be discharged, in so far as it may appear, that it
had been applied in satisfaction of the debt; and for so much as
may not have been so applied, he atone must be charged.

The claims No. 14, 20, 25, 27, 28 and 37, are founded on special-
ties, not barred by the Statute of Limitations. Upon claims No.
14, 20 and 28, absolute judgments have been obtained against the
administrator; and judgments for a proportion of the personal
assets on claims No. 25, 27 and 37. The claim No. 22, the voucher
of which was not filed here until the 11th of January, 1831, is
founded on a note under seal, which became due on the 19th of
December, 1815; and, therefore, it is clearly barred, unless it can,
by some of the circumstances connected with it, be taken out of
the statute.

The execution of the deed, upon which this claim No. 22, is
founded, has been admitted; and there are endorsed upon it seve-
ral receipts for payments, one so late as the 4th of August, 1826;
which, if shewn to be truly what they purport to be, would be suffi-
cient to take it out of the Statute of Limitations. A man cannot
be permitted to make evidence for himself; and the endorsements
by the obligee, such as these, are not admitted to prove the origi-
nal thing in demand; but being evidence in discharge of the obli-
gor, they are only consequentially evidence in favor of the obligee,
to take the case out of the presumption arising from the lapse of
time. Even to this extent, however, they are regarded as evidence
of a very questionable character, when it is recollected, that the
security remains in the hands of the obligee and that he may thus
be under a continual temptation to fabricate such endorsements
merely for the purpose of sustaining his claim tor the balance.
But to make such endorsements evidence for this purpose, it is
necessary to shew, that they were actually made, as they bear
date, within the time of limitation; for it they were made after
that time, though they may be evidence of actual payments; yet
they cannot be received as evidence to take the case out of the
statute. Humphreys v. Humphreys, 3 P. Will. 397; Glynn v. The
Bank, 2 Ves. 42; Hillary v. Waller, 12 Ves. 266; Fladong v. Winter,