48 TESSIER v. WYSE.—3 BLAND.

fact not these defendants, are not now here complaining of this
decree.

The petitioner does not pretend to have discovered any testi-
mony which she could not have had. brought into the case and
used at the hearing; nor does she. in any way, specify what the
nature of that testimony is, which she says would have an impor-
tant bearing on the merits of the plaintiff's claim. Such general
and indefinite allegations cannot afford a sufficient ground for a
rehearing. Although she was an infant, and had answered only
by her guardian ad litem; yet she bad attained her full age nearly
three months before the decree was passed; and even now she
does not impute to her guardian or solicitor any mismanagement,
or neglect of her interests. Under such circumstances, and with-
out showing any special grounds, this application must be consid-
ered as coming too late, Kemp v. Squire, 1 Ves. 206; Bennet v.
Leigh, 1 Dick. 89.

Formerly on a creditor's bill to obtain the sale of lands charged
with the payment of debts, the decree was never absolute, but
nisi causa, as against the infant heir, allowing him six months to
shew cause after he attained his full age; when he was permitted
to come in as a matter of course, and file a better answer, and
have the case reheard upon the merits as thus newly presented; or
the parol was ordered to demur as to the real estate descended
* during the minority of the heir. If, however, the heir ne-
62 glected to come In, within a reasonable time after he at-
tained full age, and shew cause against the decree nisi, he was
precluded, and it would be held to be absolute. Fountain v.
Caine, 1 P. Will. 504; Napier v. Effingham, 2 P. Will. 401; Bennett
v. Lee, 2 Atk. 531; Brookfield v. Bradley, 4 Cond. Cha. Rep. 297;
Kelsall v. Kelsall, 8 Cond. Cha. Rep. 58. But according to our
Act of Assembly, the parol cannot be ordered to demur, in a cre-
ditor's suit, during the minority of an infant heir or devisee; nor
can such an infant have a day allowed him to shew cause on his
attaining his full age. In all cases coming under that Act of
Assembly, as this does, if the creditor establishes his claim, he is
entitled to an absolute decree at once for a sale of his deceased
debtor's real estate, for the payment of his debts; 1785, ch. 72, s.
5; Hammond v. Hammond, 2 Bland, 352; Kelsall v. Kelsall, 8 Cond.
Cha. Rep. 61; Powys v. Mansfield, 9 Cond. Cha. Rep. 445; and
therefore, although an infant, on his attaining full age, pending
the suit may be allowed to come in as of course, and to demur,
plead, or answer, as he may think proper; Harwood v. Rawlings,
4 H & J. 126; Savage v. Carrol, 1 Ball. & Be. 548; yet he cannot
be permitted to do so, after a decree of this kind has been parsed,
without virtually abrogating the Act of Assembly, which, by plac-
ing infants upon a footing with adults, in this particular, does, in
effect, require of them as well as of adults, that they should shew