POST v. MACKALL.—3 BLAND. 499

the personal estate, the choice of the creditors shall not determine
whether the legatees shall be paid or not. So that wherever there

ment, in some way, of such a proportion of the whole debt so chargeable
upon the whole of the deceased's real estate, exclusive of the mortgaged
estate, actually applied to the satisfaction of the mortgage debt, as the value
of their interest therein bears to the value of the whole real estate of the
deceased at the time of his death, when their interests vested: and to which
time their protective pleas relate.—Long v. Short, 1 P. Will. 403, note; Craig
v. Baker, 2 Bland, S38, note.—James Tilton's life interest to have a value set
upon it as of that date by the Chancellor, as usual, on proof of his then age,
health, &c. This proportional deduction, unlike a claim for contribution, is
an immediate and preliminary right according to which the claim of the
creditor must be cut down before any others, who may be liable, can be
called upon to pay the sum thus ascertained to be due.

In regard to all creditors, other than those herein before spoken of, it must
also be recollected, that the Statute of Limitations, in general, enures only
to the benefit of him who pleads it; that no creditor, who has a prior right
of satisfaction, or has failed to sustain his claim, or whose claim has been,
in any way, wholly barred; and who, consequently, has no interest to bene-
fit or protect by a plea of limitations, can have any standing in this Court
to direct such a plea against, or to the prejudice of any one else.—Lingan v.
Henderson, 1 Bland. 276.—That as the personal estate is primarily liable, a
well sustained plea of the Statute of Limitations, by an executor or admin-
istrator, against the claim of any creditor must necessarily enure to the
benefit of the heirs; and, so too, a complete bar of any kind as against the
personalty must, to the same extent, be allowed to operate as a bar for the
protection of the realty.—Tessier v. Wyse, ante. 28; S. C. 4 G. & J. 396.—But
although the executor or administrator may not have pleaded the Statute of
Limitations-, or may have failed to establish such a plea when relied on,
nevertheless such a plea may be made available by the heirs to cover the
realty, a judgment even, against an executor or administrator, being no
authentication whatever against the heirs.— Duvall v. Green. 4 H. & J. 270;
Putnam v. Bates, 3 Cond. Cha. Rep. 355; Dorsey v. Hammond. 1 Bland,
470.—That as a plea of the Statute of Limitations by one of several heirs
enures to his benefit only, such a sustained plea by an heir operates as
a bar of only such a proportion of the creditor's claim as the whole of
it bears to that of such heir's interest in the whole real estate; that of
the several pleas of limitations, relied on by the several creditors, that
which has been first pleaded and filed must be first applied and have an
operation to the exclusion of any subsequent plea of limitations against
the claim of him whoso first pleads: but where pleas of the Statute of
Limitations have been filed by different creditors on the same day. so as
to have a countervailing operation against each other, all such pleas
must be rejected so far as they so operate; that no plea of the Statute
of Limitations can be of any avail against a claim stated in the bill and ex-
pressly or tactily allowed by the decree, unless upon the ground of some
specified fraud.— Strike's Case, I Bland. 68: Williamson v. Wilson. 1 Bland,
441; Welch v. Stewart, 2 Bland. 38; Hammond v. Hammond, 2 Bland, 359.
That no plea of the Statute of Limitations can be allowed against any claim
not then filed or put upon the record; that a plea of the Statute of Limita-
tions against a claim may be put in at any time after its voucher has been
filed; provided he who so pleads has not done any act which necessarily
implies a waiver of a reliance on such plea.—Welch v. Stewart, 2 Bland, 41.